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FOREWORD
Thls report describes a UNIRAM preliminary rel_ability, availability,
and maintainability study of the Space Station Electric Power System. It
was performed between July 1987 and June 1988 for the System Engineering
and Integration Dlvision of NASA Lewis Research Center under USAF contract
F05603-87-D-0006, Task Order $3-N-88-01. The project engineer was
Mr. Scott R. Turnqu_st. The principal investigators were Mr. TurnquJst
and Mr. Mark Twombly. Dr. James Witt made significant contributions
through consultations with the authors. The authors extend their thanks
to Mr. Dave Hoffman, of NASA, for his efforts in promptly answering all
technical questions dealing with this study.
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SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
ARINC Research Corporation was asked by the NASA Lewis Research
Center (LeRC) System Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Division to
perform a preliminary reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)
analysis of the Space Station Electric Power System (EPS). The Space
Station has a mission llfe of 30 years: therefore, a power system capable
of repair must be designed. Precedents for on-orbit repair and
maintenance of space-based systems have been set through the use of the
Space Shuttle, and the development of a malntainab]e Space Station is
based on these precedents. The concept of on-orblt maintalnabJlity is
being applied to the Space Station design. The EPS is a vital part of the
Space Station and on-orblt maJntalnability is Integral to its design,
The major objective of this study was to model and analyze the EPS
using the UNIRAM RAM assessment methodology. The resulting EPS model and
methodology will provide NASA with tools to continue assessing EPS design
variations from a RAM perspective. The analysis objectives of this study
included:
• Development of baseline RAM measures for EPS power generation and
distribution
Estimation of the RAM performance of the EPS when orbital
replacement unit (ORU) mean failure and repair rates are taken
into account
• Assessment of the impact of ORU maintainability changes on EPS RAM
performance
• Assessment of the impact of ORU reliability changes on EPS RAM
performance
The UNIRAM RAM assessment methodology was used to meet these
objectives. The methodology incorporates an ]8M PC-based software package
with RAM modeling techniques to perform system RAM assessments. The
UNIRAM software package was developed by ARINC Research Corporation for
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to evaluate the RAM
characteristics of e]ectrlc power generation systems.
V
The scope of the study documented in this report was defined by the
major objective and two additional constraints. At the direction of NASA
the ORU was defined to be the hardware indenture referred to in the UNIRAM
terminology as "component level," and the values used for ORU mean time
between failures (MTBF) and mean time to restore (MTTR) were estimates
that allowed a wide margin for ORU MTBF and MTTR variation for sensitivity
analyses. ORU MTBF variations were limited to a range between two scale
factors -- 5.0 and 0.7. ORU MTTRs were assumed to have only two values -
1,080 hours and 6 hours -- which corresponded to estimates of ORU
replacement times if the ORU had to be transported from the ground or if
it were available as an on-orblt spare.
Two key metrics used throughout the study are defined as follows:
Availability (A) - A measure of the amount of time, within a given
period, that a system will generate or deliver power. Another way
of stating this would be that availability is the probability of
producing power at any level.
Equivalent Availability (EA) - A ratio of the power actually
produced or delivered by a system to the power that would have
been produced or delivered had there been no system power outages
due to component failures or planned system shutdowns.
EPS RAM ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Before the EPS RAM assessment was conducted, the EPS design was
reviewed and an approach to the assessment was established. The review
showed functional differences between the EPS power generation system and
the distribution system. Figure S-I illustrates one portion of the EPS,
the power generation and dlstributlon systems were modeled separately as a
matter of convenience for the EPS RAM analyses that followed.
As illustrated in Figure S-l, EPS power is distributed to two
distinct distribution subsystems: the manned core power distribution
system which consists of power distribution control assemblies (PDCAs) and
other ORUs, and the inner keel power distribution system which consists of
power distribution control units (PDCUs) on the inner keel outside the
manned core. These systems were modeled separately to allow a RAM
assessment of each.
The EPS power generation system has two modes of operation that were
separated into two models. During the insolar mode, the EPS draws power
from the photovoltalc arrays: during the eclipse mode or operation, the
EPS draws power from the batteries.
Separating the EPS power generating system into two models causes a
problem. If EPS eclipse power generation were modeled as shown in Figure
S-l, a fully charged battery would be Inherently assumed at the beginning
of each period of eclipse operation. The cross-hatched subsystems in
Figure S-I represent subsystems that must operate in an insolar period
preceding the eclipse period so that the battery is fully charged at the
beginning of the eclipse period. There is a finite probablllty that some
subsystems will not be available to charge the battery, and that
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SPACE STATION EPS BASIC POWER GENERATION BLOCK DIAGRAM
unavailability would lead to lower power levels, on average, over a given
period of time. The availability of these subsystems has been taken into
account in the model for eclipse-period EPS power generation. These
subsystems were modeled separately, and their availabilities for battery
charging were calculated using the UNIRAM baseline execution option. The
calculated availabilities were then inserted into the eclipse power
generation model in the form of MTBFs and MTTRs in charge-effect
pseudocomponents. These components effectively reduce the eclipse power
availability, which reflects the probability that the battery may not be
fully charged at the beginning of an eclipse period.
The EPS RAM assessment was performed in the following five steps:
• Model the EPS
• Evaluate the EPS model to determine the baseline system RAM values
and component crltlca]Ity rank_ngs
• Perform assessments of EPS availability sensitivity to sparing
ORUs on-orblt
• Perform assessments of EPS ava_lab_l_ty sensitlvity to changes _n
ORU reliability and analyze expected ORU Failure rates
• Integrate the power generation and power distribution system
results to obtain overall EPS RAM performance measures
Each of these steps is briefly described in the following paragraphs:
Model the EPS
As shown in Figure S-2, the UNIRAM modeling methodology follows a
flve-step process and culminates in a UNIRAM input file, which is then
analyzed using the UNIRAM software. The following paragraphs outline each
step In the modeling methodology:
Develop an EPS Availability Block Diagram (ABD)
The EPS ABD is a representation of the system which shows how ORUs
are interconnected from the standpoint of availability. From this
standpoint, an ORU does not have to be functionally related to another ORU
to have a functional dependance on it. It is this functional dependance
which is shown in an ABD and not necessarily the physlca] connections
between ORUs (for example the thermal control system is linked in series
with the outboard main bus switching unit subsystem). The blocks within
an ABD are basic subsytems. A basic subsystem is an aggregation of one or
more components logically ]inked together to define how their failures can
cause failure of the basic subsystem. A basic subsystem has only two
output states: either it is Fully operational, or it is failed.
The Space Station Power System Description Document (PSDD) and NASA
LeRC personnel supplied the information necessary to derive the EPS ABDs.
As noted, the EDS required four distinct ABDs, however, NASA also
requested an additional evaluation of a different architecture for the
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manned core power distribution system, and that request required the
development of a fifth ABD. The following ABDs were developed for the EPS:
• Photovoltaic power generation system during the insolar portion of
an orbit (insolar ABD)
• Battery power generation system during the eclipse portion of an
orbit (eclipse ABD)
• Manned core power distribution system with a ring PDCU
architecture (power management and distribution [PMAD] ABD)
• Manned core power distribution system with a radial PDCU
architecture (PMAD ABD, special case study).
• Inner keel power distribution system outside the manned core
(inner keel ABD)
Partition the ABDs Into Basic and Nested Subsystems
Partitioning ABDs into basic and nested subsystems is an iteratlve
process. The process of nesting defines the logical connections of basic
and nested subsystems and thus defines the failure states of the system
being modeled. The first iteration of ABD partitioning forms nested
subsystems from those basic subsystems that are functionally connected in
series paths. The end points of these paths are often defined by
manifolds (a manifold is a point at which multiple functional paths
meet). Manifolding allows multiple levels of operation that are based on
failures of subsystems within the functional paths that form that
manifold. This Iterative process continues until the system is defined by
a single nested subsystem.
The basic subsystems are nested together as follows: The parallel
redundant basic subsystems are collapsed into nested subsystems (the
nested subsystem logically maps a system's functional dependence on its
basic subsystems). The resulting series of basic and nested subsystems is
then collapsed into larger nested subsystems. Ultimately, a single nested
subsystem is formed that represents the full system being modeled. Basic
and nested subsystems are addressed in more detail in Section 2.3.2 of
this report and in Reference i.
Develop Fault Trees For Each Basic Subsystem
Each basic subsystem has an associated fault tree that defines the
logical framework for the basic subsystem's dependence on indlvidua] ORUs
for its operation. Figure S-3 illustrates the two basic fault tree
types. In Figure S-3a the "and-gate" logically represents the condition
where both component A and component B must fall to fall the basic
subsystem. However, Figure S-3b shows through the use of an "or-gate",
that the failure of either component A or component B will cause the basic
subsystem to fail. These gates and special cases of them are further
discussed in Reference i.
X
Obtain ORU RAM Data
This step was performed concurrently with the previous two steps.
NASA LeRC personnel supplied estimates of the required ORU re]iabi]Ities
in the form of ORU MTBF estimates. These estimates are listed in Appendix
A, Table A-I. Two estimated values were used for the ORU MTTR values.
For an ORU required to be brought to orbit, an MTTR of 1,080 hours was
used. This value corresponds to a 45-day Space Shuttle
response time upon failure of the ORU. For an ORU that was spared
on-orblt, an MTTR of 6 hours was used as a nominal on-orblt repair time.
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Prepare UNIRAM Input Files
The UNIRAM input files are prepared in accordance with Reference 1.
The input file Includes the total system capacity, the number of hours per
year the system will be shut down (zero hours in the EPS models), and the
number of basic subsystem definitions to follow. The basic subsystem
definition incorporates the ORU definitions, the fault tree logic, and the
capacity of the basic subsystem. The ORU definitions contain the ORU MTBF
and MTTR data. Another data entry for each component is the time, in
hours, that the component's basic subsystem can function after the
component has failed. This surge capability was used for the Beta
positioning ORUs to show that loss of these components is not significant
until a given period of time has passed. The surge time increases the
basic subsystem's effective MTBF value. The nested subsystem definitions
follow those of the basic subsystem to form the UNIRAM model input flle.
xi
Evaluate the EDS Model to Determine the Baseline System RAM Data and
Component Criticality Ranklngs
The UNIRAM software was used to perform baseline analyses of each of
the system models. The analyses included system availabilities and
equivalent availabilities; system output power levels (states) and their
associated state probabilities; and ORU criticality ranking, which ranks
ORUs by their effect on system equivalent availability if they were
perfectly available. Other analyses to determine the effects of ORU MTBF
and MTTR variation on a given system model were performed, using the EPS
models.
Perform Assessments of EPS Availability Sensitivity to Sparing ORUs
On-Orblt
The sparing sensitivity analyses determined the effects on the system
of sparing ORUs either on-ground or on-orbit. Eight ORUs had a
significant impact on system availability or equivalent availability when
spared on-orbit; they are designated in this report as the eight critical
ORUs. These eight ORUs also had significant impact on the reliability
sensitivity analyses.
Perform Assessments of EPS Availability Sensitivity to Chanqes in ORU
Reliability and Analyz 9 Expected ORU Failure Rates
The reliability and reliability sensitivity analyses performed on
each of the models were similar to the sparing sensitivity analyses.
However, instead of using a single change in ORU reliabilities, the ORU
MTBFs were scaled individually and universally over a range of 0.7 to 5.0
times their baseline MTBF values. Again, the eight critical ORUs had more
impact on system equivalent availabilities than did other ORUs.
An analysis was performed to determine the expected number of ORU
failures per year. For the baseline EPS, the expected number of ORU
failures per year was 35; as anticipated, when the MTBFs of all ORUs were
doubled, that value dropped to 18. When only the eight critical ORU MTBFs
were doubled, the expected failure rate was 29 ORUs per year. Because of
system ORU redundancy, not all of these expected ORU failures would
require immediate replacement. For example, a failure of a photovoltaic
source controller (PVSC) would not require immediate repair, because the
PVSC is dually redundant.
Combine the Output States of the Power Generation System Models with the
Output States of the Power Distribution System Model to Integrate the EDS
Model Results
After the analyses were completed on each of the system models, the
power generation system results were combined with the power distribution
system results. The combination provided an indication of the RAM
performance of the EDS from each of the power generation systems to a load
in the PMAD system. The insola[, the eclipse without charge effects and
eclipse with charge effects baseline output states were combined with
those of PMAD. Each combination resulted in a range of system output
states through a load PDCA (PDCA-L3). In each combination, three analysis
xii
scenarios were used: all ORUMTTRsequal 1,080 hours, all ORUsare spared
on-orblt and the eight crltJcal ORUsare spared on orbit. In every case,
the effect on the abl]ity to supply 25 kWof load from a PMADPDCAwas
evaluated.
CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS
The Space Station Electric Power System was modeled, and a RAM
assessment was performed using the UNIRAMavailability assessment
methodology. As the EPSdesign evolves, NASAcan use the resulting EPS
models to assess EPSdesign changes on system RAMperformance. The
conclusions and recommendationsthat resulted from the EPSRAMassessments
are addressed in the following paragraphs.
EPS Po_er Generation
From a RAM perspective, eight EPS ORUs accounted for most of the EPS
RAM changes when EPS ORU rel_abJlity and maintainability parameters were
varied. These ORUs, considered crJtlcal to EPS operation, are:
• Alpha Joint Power arid Data Transfer Assembly
• Beta Gimba] Power and Data Transfer Assembly
• Charge/Discharge Unit
• Power Distribution Control Unit
• Power Management Controller
• Sequentlal Shunt Unit
• Solar Array Electronics Assembly
• Thermal Control Plate
These ORUs are possible candidates for on-orbit sparing; however, further
analyses based on ORU cost, weight, and volume considerations must be
performed to determine which ORUs should be spared.
Table S-I presents the equivalent availabilities and the
availabilities for the system variations considered in this study. The
system variations are listed iS order of descending system equivalent
availability. The equlva]ent availability change among the system
variations is large (a maximum difference of 13.99 percent), and the
availability change among the system variations is small (a maximum
difference of 0.08 percent). EPS equivalent availability is sensitive to
both ORU reliability and maintainability.
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TABLES-I
SYNOPSISOF EPSORUSPARINGANDRELJABIL[TYSENSITIVITYANALYSIS
System Variation EA(%) A(%)
Insolar
Spare All ORUs 99.'17
Double All ORUMTBFsand Spare Eight Critical ORUs 98.08
Increase All ORUMTBFsby Factor of Five 97.78
Spare Eight Critical ORUs 96.20
Increase Eight Critical ORUMTBFsby Factor of Five 95.83
Double All ORUMTBFs 94.53
Double Eight Critical ORUMTBFs 93.74
Baseline System Results 89.35
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
99.98
99.98
99.92
Eclipse without Charge Effects
Spare All ORUs 99.94
Double All ORUMTBFsand Spare Eight Critical ORUs 98.49
Increase All ORUMTBFsby Factor of Five 97.86
Spare Eight Critical ORUs 96.96
Increase Eight Crltical ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five 95.48
Double All ORU MTBFs 94.70
Double Eight Critical ORU MTBFs 93.23
Basel_ne System Results 89.58
>99.99
>99 99
>99 99
>9999
>9999
99 98
99 98
99 92
Ecllpse with Charge Effects
Spare All ORUs 99.85
Double All ORU MTBFs and Spare Eight Critlcal ORUs 96.24
Increase All ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five 94.69
Spare Eight Critical ORUs 92.55
Increase Eight Critical ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five 89.04
Double All ORU MTBFs 87.22
Double Eight Critical ORU MTBFs 83.89
Baseline System Results 75.96
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
>99.99
99.98
99.98
99.92
EPS Power Manaqement and D_stribution System
The RAM assessment showed that there is little or no difference
between PDCAs when considering the availability of power from any given
PDCA in the PMAD system. The baseline availability of the PMAD system is
99.98 percent, but ORU on-orbit sparing and reliability changes increased
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the availability to greater than 99.99 percent. Since there are 28 PDCUs
in the manned core, the only PMAD ORU considered vlable as a potential
on-orbit spare was the PDCU.
A baseline analysis of the inner keel power distribution system was
also performed. The avaJlabllJty of power from an inner keel PDCU
was97.90 percent when ORU MTTRs were 1,080 hours. When a PDCU was spared
on-orblt, the avallabJllty of power from a PDCU on the inner keel
increased to 99.99 percent.
EDS Inteqrated System
Table S-2 presents the equivalent availabilities, the probabilities
of power levels below minimum life-support levels, and the probabilities
of zero output states for the EPS integrated system analyses. Since the
PMAD system was modeled as de]iverlng power to a perfectly available 25 kW
load (33.33 percent of 75 kW, which is the total system capacity), the
equivalent availability data are on a scale of 33.33 percent. EDS
integrated system analyses were also performed for sparing only the eight
critical ORUs on-orbit. The results of these analyses were the same as
the results for sparing all ORUs on-orbit (MTTR = 6). With no on-orblt
sparing of ORUs, there is a finite probability that the EDS power output
will fall below minimum llfe-support levels.
The total number of ORUs used to model the EPS was 418. The expected
average annual failure rate is 35 ORUs per year.
TABLE S-2
EPS INTEGRATED SYSTEM RESULTS
system
Combination
Equivalent Probabl lity of Probabl lity of
Aval labl Iity Less Than Minimum Zero Output
(%) l.ife-Suppor t State
MTTR=I,080 M'I'TR_6 MTTR=l,080 MTTR_6 MTTR=],080 MTTR=6
PMAD and Insolar 33.29
PMAD and Eclipse 33.29
(No Charge Effects)
PMAD and Eclipse 33.25
33.33 0.0010 <0.0001 0.0010 <0.000]
33.33 0.0010 <0.0001 0.0010 <0.0001
33.33 0.0015 <0.000] 0.0010 <0.0001
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Recommendations
As this study was performed, the following further analyses were
identified as necessary:
An analysis of the EPS, taking into consideration various
distributed power load scenarios should be performed. The
Initlalanalysis used a single 25-kW load at the output of the
dJstrlbutionsystem, but a subsequent evaluation would not only
distribute the single 25-kW load to other PDCUs in the manned
core, but would alsoaccount for the insolation period system load
represented by the EPS battery charge. If possible, load-shedding
ranking factors should be used to determine the availabil_ty of
power to each load under the ranking criteria. Ultimately, this
study would provide information on the EPS ability to supply power
in various load con[iguratlons.
An analysis incorporating the lifetime data associated with the
EPS batteries and photovo]taic arrays should be performed. This
analysis would center on the use of a distribution function, such
as the Welbul], to determine yearly MTBF values. The values would
then be used in several UNIRAM analyses to study the decrease in
EPS performance as the battery packs and photovoltaic arrays
degrade with age. This analysis would also yield an expected
annual ORU failure rate that would increase as the lifetimes of
the batteries and photovoltaic arrays are reached.
RAM analyses of individual ORUs, taking into consideration the
parts makeup within the ORU, should be performed These analyses
would provide possible output states and state probabilities for
the ORU. The states and state probabilities would then be
incorporated into a system analysis for a more precise indication
of system RAM performance using actual capabilities of selected
ORUs.
An ORU parts-type evaluation similar to a MIL-HDBK-217E (Ref. 2)
analysis should be performed on selected ORUs. This analysis
should include the previously identified eight critical ORUs. The
purpose of the analysis would be to establ_sh more accurate
predictions of the ORU MTBFs.
• Analyses specific to selecting an optimum on-orblt level of ORU
spares for the EPS should be performed. These analyses would
consider such constraints as: EPS RAM considerations, ORU mass,
volume, cost to lift, and the requirements for ORU spares testing
while ORUs are on-orbit.
An In-depth analysis of EPS maintainability should be performed.
It should use expected ORU failure rates and on-orbit sparing
scenarios as well as the proposed EPS intravehicular activity
(IVA)and extravehicular activity (EVA) budgets allowed for EPS
maintenance. The analysis results would identify possible
xvi
malntenance strategles to trade IVA and EVAhours for degraded levels of
system performance and would determine the adequacy of the IVA and EVA
budgets as they relate to various levels of system performance.
An EPStestability analysis should be performed to determine if
the current ORUpackaging and test point distribution is adequate
to isolate faults to at least individual ORUs.
xvii
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I.] INTRODUCTION
ARINC Research Corporation was tasked by the NASA Lewis Research
Center (LeRC) System Engineering and Integration (_E&I) Division to
perform a reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) analysis of
the Space Station Electric Power System (EPS). The Space Station has a
mission llfe of 30 years; therefore, a power system capable of repair must
be designed. Precedents for on-orbit repair and maintenance of
space-based systems have been set due to the use of the Space Shuttle, and
the development of a maintainable Space Station is based on these
precedents. The concept of on-orbit maintainability is being applied to
the Space Station design. The EPS is a vital part of the Space Station
and on-orblt maintainability is integral to its design.
The major objective of this study was to model and analyze the EPS
using the UNIRAM RAM assessment methodology. The resulting EPS model and
methodology will provide NASA with tools to continue assessing EDS design
variations from a RAM perspective. The analysis objectives of this study
included:
® Development of baseline RAM measures for EPS power generation and
d_strlbut_on
Estimation of the RAM performance of the EPS when orbital
replacement unit (ORU) mean failure and repair rates are taken
into account
• Assessment of the impact of ORU maintainability changes on EPS RAM
performance
• Assessment of the impact of ORU re]iability changes on EDS RAM
performance
The UNIRAM RAM assessment methodology was used to meet these
objectives. This methodology incorporates an IBM PC-based software
package with RAM mode]ing techniques to perform system RAM assessments.
The UNIRAM software package was developed by ARfNC Research Corporation
for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to evaluate the RAM
characteristics of electric power generation systems.
I I
1.2 SCOPE
This report documents the application of the UNIRAMmethodology to
the EPSand the preliminary analysis results. It applies to the Phase 1
EPSdesign as defined by the Power System Description Document(PSDD),
dated July 1987, and its revisions (as mentioned in the Space Station
Electric Power System Proposal) through March 1988. This excludes the
solar dynamic system and incorporates two additional photovoltalc modules
on each side of the Space Station. The study was predominantly defined by
its major objective. However, two other ]imitations were placed upon the
RAMassessment. At the direction of NASA,the ORUwas defined as the
component ]eve] for this study. This meansthat when an ORUfails, it
will not produce, pass, or control system power in any manner. In
addition, the values used for ORUmeantime between failures (MTBF)and
meantime to restore (MTTR)were based on NASAestimates as listed in
Appendix A, Table A-I. The values were obtained from discussions with
NASALeRCpersonnel and from Reference 3. Since they are estimates, there
was wide margin within which the ORUMTBFscould be varied for sensitivity
analyses. An upper-limlt MTBFscale factor of 5.0 and a iower-llmlt scale
factor of 0.7 were used. Also, the ORU MTTR data were represented by only
two values. An ORU MTTR of 1,080 hours (45 days) was used, which
corresponds to an estimate of the mean amount of time Jt would take to
bring a replacement ORU from the ground to orbit. The other MTTR used was
6 hours, which corresponds to an estimate of the mean t_me Jt will take to
replace an ORU that is spared on-orbit.
1.3 REPORT ORGANIZAT£ON
This report is organized into four chapters and four appendixes.
Chapter Two describes each of the steps in the analysis methodology.
Chapter Three presents the results of the analyses. Chapter Four provides
conclusions and recommendations based on the results of the analyses. The
appendixes present modeling information (Appendix A), data generated
during the analyses (Appendix B), references (Appendix C), and definitions
of terms and concepts used in this report (Appendix D).
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CHAPTER TWO
EPS RAM A',_SE',3SMENTME'I'HODOI.OCV
2. ] APPROACH
An JnltJa] examirlatlon of the EPS design revealed the following
modeling considerations :
The Space Station EPS has two types of power generating systems
and a power dlstributJon system. The distribution system has been
functlona]]y separated from the power generation system.
The power distribution system has two points of output: (1) the
manned core dJstrlbutJon system and (2) the ironer keel
dJstrlbutJon sysLem (outside the manned core but inside the alpha
joints).
The EPS power generation system _s operated in two modes: (I)
eclipse period operation and (2) Jnso]ar period operation. Each
of these operating modes has a different power source. During
eclipse operation, the EPS draws power from the batteries. During
the Jnsolar period, the EPS draws power from the photovoltaJc
panel arrays.
• The photovo]taic and battery powe_ generating systems are assumed
to generate power exclusively of one another over any given orbit.
Figure 2-] Js a functional diagram of EPS power generation and
distribution from a single photovo]talc module. The modellng
considerations led to the determination that multiple RAM models were
needed to completely mode] the EPS; therefore, an assessment approach
using multiple models for the RPS RAM analysis was also required. This
approach modeled the four speclfJc systems identified Jn the
considerations above: the photovoltaJc power generation system, the
eclipse power generation system, the manned core distribution system and,
the inner keel distribution system. Also, there were special cases of
interest that required their own models, as discussed in Section 2.3.1.
2]
bo
I I
II
I
I
l
Beta Clml_
PotN_dng
ORUe
All:#.= Joint
pol_Jonlng
ORU8
-T//e._.._,//J
r//k.,mb_//J
I',///////A
Innor Keel
Powe_
Obtffoutkm
Mannod Co_
Pmmr
Olsb,rou_mn
0 0
,-n;0
02[
c:_:'
rrrl
FIGURE 2-I
SPACE STATION b_F_ BASIC POWERGENERATION BI.OCK DIAGRAM
2.2 METHODOLOGY
Two key metrics were used to quantify the RAM of the EPS. They are
defined as follows:
Aval]abl]ity (h) A measure of the amount of time, within a given
period, that a system will generate or deliver power. Another way
of stating this would be that availability Js the probability of
producing power at any ]eve]. UNIRAM calculates availability
using a polnt-estlmate technique.
Equivalent Availabillty (EA) - A ratio of the power actually
produced or delivered by a system to the power that would have
been produced or de]ivered had there been no system power outage:;
due to component failures or planned system shutdowns.
The methodology for conducting a RAM assessment of the Space Station
EPS was divided into five steps:
• Model the EPS
• Evaluate the KPS mode] to determine the baseline system RAM values
and ORU criticality rankJngs
• Perform assessments of EPS availability sensitivity to sparing
ORUs on-orbit
• Perform assessments of EPS availability sensitivity to changes in
ORU reliability and analyze expected ORU failure rates
• Integrate the power generation and power distribution system
results to obtain overall EPS RAM performance measures
Sections 2.3 through 2.7 address each of these steps in detail.
2.3 MODEL THE EPS
The first step Jn the _:PS RAM assessment methodology was to model the
EPS. The UNIRAM modeling methodology permits the UNIRAM so[tware to
relate any failure or combination of failures at the ORU (component) level
to the resultant loss _n system power output capability (Ref. ]).
As shown in Figure 2-2, the E_ was modeled using the following five
steps:
• Develop an EPS availability block diagram (ABD)
• Partition the ABDs into basic and nested subsystems
• Develop fault trees
• Obtain ORU RAM data
• Prepare UNfRAM input flies
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2.3.1 Develop an EPS Avai]abJlity___Bloqk_D_Ja_ram
An availability block diagram is a representation of a system which
shows how components are interconnected from the standpoint of
availability. From thls standpoint, a component does not have to be
functionally related to another component to have a functional dependance
on it. It Js this functional dependance which Js shown Jn an ABD and not
necessarily the physical connections between components (for example the
thermal control system Js ]inked in series with the outboard main bus
switching unit subsystem). The points at which multiple functional paths
meet are called manifolds. Manifolding allows multiple output states of
operation based on failures within the functional pdths that converge to
or diverge from the manifold. Manifolds often mark the boundaries of
basic subsystems or the boundaries between nested subsystems; thus, _hey
provide Jr,formation about subsystem structure (Ref. 4). Figure 2-3 Js an
example of an ABD for a thermal control system. The two thermal control
system ORUs are on parallel paths connected by a manifold.
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100.00_ _
THERMAL
CONTROL
SYSTEM (TCS)
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The EPS has four functional and operational portions, as illustrated
Jn Figure 2-1. For this reason and for other reasons discussed Jn the
following paragraphs, the EPS required the following sysLem ABDs for
modeling and analysis:
• The photovo]taJc power generation system during the Jnso]ar
portion of an orbit (Jnso]ar ABD)
• The eciipse power generation system during the eclipse portion of
an orbit (eclipse ABD)
• The power management and distribution system ABDs:
•• The manned core power distribution system through a ring PDCU
architecture (PMAD ABD)
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• , The manne(](:ore power distrlbution system through a radial
PDCUarchitecture (I_MAI)NBD, special case study)
•. The inner keel power distribution system, outside the manned
core and through the inner keel PDCUs (inner keel ABD)
The EPS has two types of power sources that operationally complement
each other during a single orbit; F_gure 2-] illustrates both. It was
assumed that the photovo]ta_c power generation system (Jnsolar period) and
the battery power generation system (eclipse period) generate power
exclusively of one another; therefore, these two power generating systems
were separated to form two major _ubsystems of the EPS. By separating
them, all of the eclipse operation cycles in a given period have been
collapsed into one system period of eclipse operation. Also, all of the
insolar operation cycles have been collapsed into one system period of
Insolar operation.
To account for the availability of the ORUs required for a full
battery charge during an insolation cycle that precedes a given eclipse
cycle, charge-effect pseudocomponents were used in the eclipse ABD. A
separate UNIRAM mode] (charge-effect model) was used to model the groups
of ORUs required to provide a full battery charge. These ORUs are the
cross-hatched ORUs Jrl Figure 2-I. The effective MTBF and MTTR data were
calculated using the baseline UNIRAM execution option wlth this model.
These MTBF and MTTR values were then used as the charge-effect
pseudocomponent data. The validity of accounting for the availability of
a full battery in this way is discussed in Sectlon A.2 of Appendlx A. The
eclipse period was modeled both with and w_thout charge effects. All
eclipse analyses were conducted twice - once with the charge-effect
pseudocomponents set to "perfect" avaJ]abillty, and once using the
effective MTBF and MTTR values.
The power management and distribution (PMAD) systems (Figure 2-1)
were modeled separately from the two power generation systems. For
analysis purposes _t was convenient to separate power generation models
from the PMAD system models. EPS power generation Js functlona11y
different from EPS power distribution. The EPS power generation systems
have many probable output power levels (states) and require a measure of
system equivalent availability. The EPS PMAD system consists of many
redundant paths, each with a capacity of 25 kW. If a path is available,
power is delivered to the load; therefore, PMAD has only two output states
- 25 kW and 0 kW. Since there are only two output states, availability
becomes the RAM parameter of interest. In addition, the PMAD system was
modeled as del_vering power to a perfectly available 25-kW load.
Three ABDs were used for the PMAD system. The ring PDCU architecture
ABD (PMAD ABD) is shown in Figure 2-d. The radial PDCU architecture ABD,
shown in Figure 2-5, was developed for a special case study at the request
of NASA (PMAD ABD, special case study), and Jt was used to mode] a radla]
PMAD PDCU architecture that, when analyzed, provided data for comparing
the baseline RAM results of the two PMAD architectures. The _nner keel
distribution ABD (inner keel ABD), shown _n Figure 2-6, was developed to
model and determine the baseline RAM results for power distribution
outside the manned core but inside the alpha joints.
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The EPS ABDs for each of the systems are provided In Section A.3 of
Appendix A. The charge-effect mode] is comprised of four basic subsystems,
each representing a charge-effec[ pseudocomponent. Fault trees for the
charge effect basic subsystems are also presented in Section A.3.The ABDs
were formulated on the basis of information from the Power System
Description Document (PSDD, Ref. 3) and discussions with NASA I,eRC
personnel.
2.3.2 Partition the ABDs Into Basic and Nested Subsystems
A basic subsystem is one level of aggregation above the component
level, when "component" is defined as the level at which the MTBF and MTTR
data are collected or estimated. For the EPS, ORUs are considered the
component level. Two components in the EPS UNIRAM models are not ORUs.
At the request of NASA, the fault isolator was modeled as a component
separate from its charge/d_scharge unit (CDU). The dc remote bus
isolators (DC-RBIs), which couple the CDU to the dc switch unit (DCBU),
were also modeled as separate components. Basic subsystems have only two
levels of capacity -- full and zero.
A nested subsystem is an aggregation of basic subsystems and other
nested subsystems. The nesting follows the manifolding in the ABD. There
are two types of nested subsystems - a series configuration and a
parallel configuration. A nested subsystem has two or more levels of
output capability, based on the capacities and the number of subsystems
nested wlthln it.
Partitioning ABDs into basic and nested subsystems is an Iteratlve
process. The process of nesting defines the logical connections of basic
and nested subsystems and thus defines the fal]ure states of the system
being modeled. The basic subsystems of the system ABDs are iterative]y
redtlced (collapsed) into a single nested subsystem as part of the modeling
process. To accomplish this reduction, serial and parnl]el arrangements
of basic and nested subsystems are collected _nto progressively larger
nested subsystems. The final nested subsystem contains all other
subsystems and is equivalent to the full system belng modeled (Ref. l).
For example, the basic subsystems shown in F_gure 2-3 are nested Into a
single nested subsystem by combining the two thermal control systems (TCS)
into a nested subsystem with a parallel configuration and then combining
this nested subsystem with the TCS radiator pane] subsystem into a series
conf_guratlon to obtain the final nested subsystem.
2.3.3 Develop Fault Trees for Each_Basic Subsystem
Every EPS baslc subsystem has an associated fault tree that defines a
loglcal framework for indicating which combJnatlons of component failures
within a basic subsystem would make that basic subsystem unavailable.
Figure 2-7 illustrates the two basic fault tree types. In Figure 2-7a the
"and-gate" logically represents the condition where both component A and
component B must fail to fail the basic subsystem. However, Figure 2-7b
shows that, through the use of an "or-gate", the failure of either
component A or component B will cause the basic subsystem to fall. These
gates and special cases of them are further discussed in Re[ference i.
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2.3.4 Obtain ORU RAM Data
Estimates of ORU MTBFs were obtained from NASA [.eRC personnel and
from the PSDD (refer to AppendS× A). ORU MTTR data were based on the mean
time it wlll take to bring a replacement ORU on-orbit, using the Space
Shuttle. Thls value is assumed to be ],080 hours (45 days). If the ORU
Is assumed to be spared on-orbit, the ORU MTTR Js 6 hours. An ORU MTTR of
6 hours Js an estimate of the mean time any ORU will require for
replacement when spared on-orblt.
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2.3.5 Prepare UNIRAM Input Flles
The UNIRAM input file describes the system mode] at the system,
subsystem, and ORU levels. It uses the previous four modeling steps to
implement the EPS models in a coded form so that the UNIRAM software can
be used to determine the RAM values of the EPS models. The input file
contains specific information about the availability block diagram,
Including subsystem nesting. The input file also includes the total
system capacity, the number of hours per year the system will be shut down
(zero hours in the EPS models), and the number of basic subsystem
definitions to follow. The basic subsystem definltlon incorporates the
ORU definitions, the fault tree logic, and the capacity of the basic
subsystem. The ORU definitions contain the ORU MTBF and MTTR data.
Another data entry for each ORU is the time, in hours, that the ORU's
basic subsystem can function after the ORU has failed. This surge
capability was used for the Beta posJtionlng ORUs to show that loss of its
ORUs is not significant until a given period of time has passed. The
surge time increases the basic subsystem's effective MTBF value. The
nested subsystem definitions follow those of the basic subsystem to form
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the UNIRAM mode] input file. The UNIRAM input files for the EPS are
presented in Section A.4 of Appendix A. Refference ] contains complete a
description of the UNiRAM input file structure.
2.4 EVALUATE BASELINE EPS RAM VAI.U_S AND ORU CR/'I']CAI.F'I'YRANK[NGS
2.4.1 Initial System Availabilities, Equivalent Availabilities, and
Output States
A baseline execution of UNIRAM yields predictions of system
performance on the basis of the operating philosophy and expected
equipment performance assumed In the modeling process (Ref. l). The
baseline UNIRAM runs were used to predict:
• The expected system output states and the probability of operation
at each output state
• System performance measures, including aval]abi]ity, equivalent
availability, forced outage rate, and equivalent forced outage rate
Two sets of baseline UN]RAM analyses were performed on all EPS
models. The first set was performed with all ORU MTTRs set to 6 hours,
and the second was performed with all ORU MTTRs set to 1,080 hours.
2.4.2 ORU Critlcallt_ Ranklnq_s_
An important part of the EPS RAM assessment, in addition to system
output states and system RAM measures, was an analysis of the system at
the ORU level. UNIRAM component crJtlcality ranking runs were performed
for each model to evaluate the impact of individual ORUs on system
performance. The component critlca]ity ranking run ranks the ORUs in
order of their contribution to system equiva]ent availability. The
ranking factor is the amount of change in system equlva]ent aval]ahi]Ity
that would be obtained if the ORU were made perfectly available. The
magnitude of the ranking factor is a function of the ORU MTBF and MTTR,
its throughput capacity, and its location in the system configuration
(Ref. i). When an EPS mode] was evaluated for its ORU crltJca]Ity
ranking, the ORU MTTRs were set to 1,080 hours. The ORU criticality
rankings for the EPS models are listed in Appendix B.
2.5 EPS SPARING SENS]TIVI'I'Y ASSESSMENTS
For this study, ORU sparing is deflned as ]ocatlng the spare ORU
on-orblt. The effect of having a spare ORU on-orbit versus having one
on-ground is a reduction in MTTR from 1,080 hours to 6 hours. Some ORUs
will take fewer than 6 hours to restore, and some will take longer. An
average of 6 hours was used because the change in system performance due
to changes of ORU MTTRs from ]2 hours to 6 hours, or from 6 hours to 3
hours, is negligible compared with the change Jn system performance when
the spare ORU is moved from on-ground to on-orbit.
Sparing sensitivity analyses were performed on the inso]ar, eclipse
without charge effects, eclipse with charge effects, and PMAD (ring PDCU
architecture) models. The baseilne component crlticailty rankings for
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each model in the analyses were used in two ways: MTTRswere varied only
for ORUswith non-zero ranking factors, and the ORUranklngs specified
the order in which ORUMTTRswere varied. ORUswere first spared on-orblt
individually and then spared on-orbit cumulatlve]y (in order of the
criticality ranklngs). For the eclipse mode] with charge effects, the
procedure was first to vary the ORUMTTRin the charge-effect model to
calculate the new effective MTBFand MTTRof the pseudocomponents. These
MTBFsand MTTRswere then inserted into the eclipse system model. The
Insolar ORUsused in the charge-effect model were interspersed amongthe
ranked eclipse ORUson the basis of their rankings. The order of the ORU
rankings in the resulting modified ORUcriticality ranking supplied the
order of ORUMTTRvariation in the eclipse with charge-effects system
model.
The output data of the previous analyses were tabulated to show the
effects that sparing an ORUon-orbit has on system availability and
equivalent availability. These data are listed in Appendix B. The
tabulated data were examined to determine which of the ORUshave a
slgnificant impact on system availability and equivalent availability when
spared on-orbit. These ORUswere considered critlca] and possible
candidates for on-orblt sparing.
2.6 ASSESSMENT OF EPS AVAII.AHII.ITY SP:NSi'£fVJ"£Y TO ORU M'J'BFAND FAII,URE
RATE ANALYSES
The maln variable in the reliability assessment and the failure rate
analyses is ORU MTBF. Analyses were performed to determine the effect
that varying ORU MTBFs had on system performance.
2.6.1 System Availability and Equivalent Availability
Reliability sensitivity assessments were performed on the insolar,
eclipse without charge-effects, Eclipse with charge-effects, and PMAD
(ring PDCU architecture) models. The MTBFs of selected ORUs in each
system model were varied by scale factors from 0.7 to 5.0, and the
resultant system availabilities and equivalent avai]abilltJes were
tabulated. The ORUs to be analyzed were selected on the basis of their
criticality ranklngs. In the PMAD system, only the PDCU MTBF was varied.
The MTBFs of all the ORUs in each system model were then varied by scale
factors from 0.7 to 5.0, and the resultant system avai]abilitles and
equivalent avai]abJ]itles were tabulated. Finally, the MTBFs of the group
of critical ORUs identified in the sparing sensltIvJty analyses were
varled by scale factors from 0.7 to 5.0. The resultant tabulations of
system availabilities and equivalent availabilities are listed in Appendix
B.
2.6.2 Failure Rate Analyses
The EPS system ORU failure rates were calculated to determine the
expected number of ORU failures in a one-year period. The results of this
analysis are shown in Appendix B. The fo]lowlng equation was used:
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EPS system ORU failure rate -
m
_. (t * Ni* k i)
i:l
whe re
i = component
m = total number of separate components in system
t = period of interest = 8,760 hours (] year)
N i = number of times the component is repeated in the system
k i = component failure rate (failures per hour)
2.7 INTEGRATe] THE POWER G_:N_:RATION MODEI,,q AND THP, POWER D_S'I'RFBUT/ON
MODEL RF.SULTS
The various output states and state probabilities for the finso]ar,
eclipse without charge effects, and eclipse with charge-effects models
were combined with those of the PMAD (ring PDCU a_ch_tecture) mode] to
obtain the EPS integrated system results. The method used for this
analysis essentially connects each power generation system with the power
distribution system in a series configuration. The procedure for
combining the power states is explained in the following example.
Table 2-I presents examples of power distribution and power
generation system output states and their associated output state
probabilities and state power levels. For this study, power generation
was assumed to be independent of power distributlon. For independent
systems in series, the combined system output states are found by
caicuiatlng all possible comblnat_ons of the output states for the systems
making up the combined system. The output state probability for each
combined state is the product of the probabilities of the states being
combined. Table 2-2 shows all posslb]e combinations for the two models in
Table 2-I. For the combined system, any g_ven output state power level is
the minimum power level of the two states (one for each unit in the
combination) being combined. The combinations in Table 2-2 are reduced to
the flna] combined output states _n Table 2-3 by adding the state
probab_litles of combinations with the same output capability.
2--15
TABI.E 2-I
JOINT STATE PROBABII,ITY EXAMPLF.
(A) Sample Power D]strJbutlon Unit Output SLates
Output
State
Output State Output Output State
Capability State Power Level
(%) Probability (kW)
33.33333 0.9500 25
0.00000 0.0500 0
(B) Sample Power Generation Unit Output States
100.0000 0.7500 75
80.0000 0.]000 60
60.0000 0.0500 45
40.0000 0.0400 30
20.0000 0.0300 15
0.0000 0.0300 0
SAMPLE POWER
']'ABLE2-2
D]S'rR_BU'r;ON SYSTEM AND POWER GENERATION
SYSTEM STATE COMBINATIONS
Output
State
Output State Output Output State
Capability State Power Level
(%) Probability (kW)
A1 * B1
A1 * B2
A1 * B3
A1 * B4
A1 * B5
A1 * B6
A2 * B1
A2 * B2
A2 * B3
A2 * B4
A2 * B5
A2 * B6
33.3333
33.3333
33.3333
33.3333
20.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
.
O.
O.
O.
O.
0.7125 25
0.0950 25
0.0475 25
0.0380 25
0.0285 15
0.0285 0
0.03"75 0
0050 0
0025 0
0020 0
0015 0
0015 0
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TABI.H 2--3
SAMPLE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND
POWER GENERATION SYSTEM FINAl. COMBINED STATES
Output
State
Output State Output Output State
CapabJ]Jty State Power [.eve]
(%) ProbabJ]Jty (kW)
1 33.3333 0.8930
2 20.0000 0.0285
3 0.0000 0.0';85
25
15
0
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS RESULTS
The analysis methodology presented in Chapter Two provides results
concerning the expected availability of the Space Station Electric Power
System. In addition to baseline information, the methodology provides
results for determining the effects of varying ORU reliability and
maintainability on system availability. ORU reliability was varied by
changing ORU MTBF. ORU maintainability was varied by reducing ORU MTTR
between on-orblt sparing (MTTR = 6 hours) and on-ground sparing (MTTR =
1,080 hours). This chapter describes and discusses the results of the
following:
o EPS Baseline RAM Analyses
o EPS Sparing Sensitlvity Analyses
Q EPS Reliability Sensitivity Analyses
® Comparison of EPS Model Re]iabilitJes and Maintalnabilitles
® EPS Integrated System Evaluation
• EPS ORU Failure and Replacement Rate
The tabular data supporting all figures and data discussed in this chapter
are listed in Appendix B.
3.1 EPS BASELINE RAM ANALYSES
This section discusses system availability and equivalent
availability and system ORU criticality ranking
3.].1 Insolar Baseline RAM Analysis
The baseline availability is 99.92 percent; the corresponding
baseline equivalent availability is 89.35 percent. There are 61 possible
output states for the insolar model; 16 of the output states have state
probabilities less than 0.00000]. Table 3-I shows the Insolar system
output states with output probabilities greater than 0.01. There are
three output states with power levels below the 12.5 kW assumed necessary
for minimum life support. The three output states yield a total
3-i
probability of 0.00085"/ of falling below the mtnimum life-support level,
including a zero-output state probability of 0.000783. This value is
represented as a combined state in Table 3-1.
TABLE 3-I
SIGNIFICANT /NSO[.AR SYSTEM OUTPUT STATES
Output Capability Output State Days Per Power
(%) Probability Year Output (kW)
i00.00 0.393899 ]43.77 "75.0
99.69 0.053547 19.54 74.8
87.50 0.301812 110.16 65.6
87.19 0.035900 13.10 65.4
81.83 0.024162 8.82 61.4
75.00 0.104130 38.01 56.3
74.69 0.010617 3.88 56.0
62.50 0.020964 7.65 46.9
50.00 0.020530 7.49 37.5
<16.67 0.000857 0.31 <12.5
The Insolar ORU crltlcality ranking shows that the alpha joint
power data transfer assembly (Alpha-PDT) has the highest criticality
ranking which is followed closely by the rankings for the beta PDT,
sequential shunt unit, DC switch unit and the solar array electronics
assembly. The Alpha-PDT has the highest criticality because its failure
would cause a 50-percent reduction in system output capability.
3.1.2 Eclipse Baseline RAM Analysis
The eclipse power generation model was evaluated with and without
taking into account the probability of a full battery charge at the
beginning of the eclipse period. To account for the probability of a full
battery charge at the beginning of an eclipse cycle, charge-effect
pseudocomponents were incorporated at the appropriate points in the
eclipse model. Section A.2 of Appendix A presents a discussion of
charge-effect use and pseudocomponent location in the eclipse model, To
evaluate the eclipse model wlthout charge effects, the charge-effect
pseudocomponents were made perfectly available.
For the ecllpse model without charge effects, the baseline
availability is 99.92 percent and the corresponding equivalent
availability Is 89.57 percent. There are 21 possible output states with 1
output state having a state probability less than 0.000001. Table 3-2
presents the output states with output probabilities greater than 0.01.
There are four output states with power levels below the 12.5 kW necessary
for minimum life support. The four output states yield a total
3-2
probability of 0.000798 of falling below the minimumlife-support level,
includlng a zero-output state probabJllty of 0.000782. This value is
represented as a combined state in Table 3-2.
TABLE 3-2
SIGNIFICANT ECLIPSE SYSTEM OUTPUT STATES (WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS)
Output Capability Output State Days Year Power
(%) Probabl]ity Output (kW)
100.00 0.191128 69.76 75.0
95.00 0.288218 105.20 7].3
90.00 0.224706 82.02 67.5
85.00 0.137810 50.30 63.7
80.00 0.07163] 26.15 60.0
75.00 0.033810 12.34 56.3
70.00 0.01489] 5.44 52.5
50.00 0.01266] 4.62 37.5
<16.67 0.000798 0.29 <12.5
For the eclipse model with charge effects, the baseline
availability is again 99.92 percent. However, the corresponding
equivalent availability is 75.95 percent. The decrease in equivalent
availability when charge effects are considered exceeds 13 percent. The
significant impact on equivalent availability when charge effects are used
emphasizes the importance of the availability of a full battery charge at
the beginning of the eclipse period. Aval|ah_lity was not affected,
because charge effects reduce the availability of charge on _ndivJdual
battery sets. To affect avallablllty, the probabillty of the zero-output
state must be affected. Since there are four full battery sets in the
eclipse model, even with charge effects, the probability of simultaneous
failure of all batteries is still low. Hence, charge effects have no
effect on availability.
Eclipse with charge effects has the same 21 possible output
states as eclipse without charge effects, but the output state
probabilities differ significantly. Table 3-3 lists the output states
wlth output probablllties greater than 0.01. Eclipse with charge effects
has a zero-output state probability of 0.000790. The probability of
falling below the minimum llfe-support power level of 12.5 kW is
0.001287. Figure 3-I illustrates why there is a significant drop in
equivalent availability when charge effects are considered. Figure 3-i is
a plot of output state probabilities for the possible output power levels
of eclipse with and without charge effects. On the basis of Figure 3-],
the most probable output states for eclipse w_th charge effects are lower
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than those for eclipse without charge effects. An output state
probability can be interpreted as the percentage of time spent at a given
output state. Since less time is spent in the higher output power states
because of charge effects, equivalent availability is lower.
TABLE3-3
SIGNIFICANTECI.[PSESYSTEMOUTPUTSTATES(WITHCHARGEFFECTS)
Output Capability Output State Days Per Power
(%) Probability Year Output (kW)
I00.00 0.021545 7.86
95.00 0.067433 24.61
90.00 0.113"707 41.50
85.00 0.147591 53.87
80.00 0.157565 57.51
75.00 0.143823 52.50
70.00 0.116384 42.48
65.00 0.083777 30.58
60.00 0.054586 19.92
55.00 0.032362 11.81
50.00 0.021613 7.89
45.00 0.015166 5.54
<16.67 0.001287 0.47
75.0
71.3
67.5
63.7
60.0
56.3
52.5
48 8
45 0
4] 3
37 5
33 8
<12 5
The ORU criticality ranking for eclipse without charge effects
shows that the battery has a slightly greater ranking than the Alpha-PDT,
the DC switch unit, the CDU fault isolator and the CDU for this model.
Making the battery perfectly available has more impact on system
equivalent availabillty than making the other ORUs perfectly available,
because the baseline MTBF of the battery is eight years and the baseline
MTBF of the other ORUs is ten years or more.
The ORU criticality ranking for Eclipse with charge effects shows
that two charge-effect pseudocomponents are considered the most critical
components: partial photovoltaJc (PV) module charge effects and battery
charge effects. Together, these two components account for almost all of
the 13-percent decrease in equivalent availability resulting from the use
of charge effects. This is because partial PV module charge effects and
battery charge effects contain nearly all the ORUs that are incorporated
in the charge-effect components. The remainder of this criticality
ranking is similar to that for eclipse without charge effects.
3.1.3 PMAD Baseline RAM Analysis
Initially, baseline analyses were performed on model variations
of the PMAD system in a ring architecture (Figure 3-2). The variations
3-4
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changed which PDCA was at the end of the distribution chain of PDCUs.
Thls determined which PDCA had the least availability and equivalent
availability. The laboratory module (LAB) and habitation module (HAB)
distribution systems are identlcal relative to the UNIRAM methodology, and
the LAB module was modeled. The results obtained are applicable to the
HAB module as well. As shown in Figure 3-3, there is essentially no
difference In availability among the PDCAs. All further analyses were
performed using a PMAD configuration that modeled power flow through
PDCA-L3 to a perfectly available 25-kW load, as explained In Section
2.3.1. Since the load will be distributed between all PDCAs and the
other PDCAs are more available than PDCA-L3, the analysis with a 25-kW
load provides lower bounds on PMAD availability and equivalent
availability levels. Since the results reflect the use of the 25-kW load
in the model, the perfect equivalent availability figure is 33.3333
percent (rather than 100.000 percent), because PMAD was modeled with a
system capacity of 75 kW.
The baseline availability for the PMAD is 99.98 percent, and the
corresponding equivalent availability is 33.33 percent. All components In
the PM/H3 system are modeled with a 33.33 percent throughput capaclty
(33.33 percent of the total system capacity of 75 kW). For this reason,
there were only two output states -- 25 kW and 0 kW. If a path is
available, the power will be dellvered to the load. Since there are only
two possible output states, the probability of falling below the minimum
llfe-support level of 12.5 kW is the same as the zero-output state
probability of 0.000]87.
The PDCU is the highest ranked ORU in the PMAD ORU criticality
ranking. The PDCUs that make up the load center PDCA, in this case PDCUs
L3A and L3B (Figure 3-2) are at the end points of the availability chain
of components and, therefore, will always rank highest. The remaining
ORUs have approximately the same ranking and are not expected to be of
critical concern.
3.2 EPS SPARING SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
The sparing sensitivity analyses were performed to provide an
indication of the importance of ORU MTTR to EPS operation. ORUs were
spared on-orbit individually and cumulatively, In order of the system
criticality ranklngs, to determine the effects on system availability and
equivalent availability. The cumulative ORU on-orbit sparing results
follow directly from the results obtained for individual on-orbit sparing
of ORUs. Only the results of individual ORU on-orbit sparing are
discussed in this section. Most of the effects of sparing ORUs on system
equivalent availability are centered on eight ORUs. From a RAM
perspective only, these eight ORUs could be recommended for potential
on-orblt spares.
In both the insolar and eclipse models, thermal control plates (TCPs)
are prominent in their effects on equivalent availability when spared
on-orblt. These effects are not apparent from the criticality rankings.
As long as an ORU's population in the EPS is reflected by the subsystem
nesting within the unit, it is taken _nto account in the criticality
ranking. The TCPs are not modeled such that the subsystem nesting will
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account for the population of the ORU TCP. Since each TCP is within the
fault tree of another ORU, UNIRAM does not evaluate a single ORU type
called TCP. It evaluates, for example, a CDU-TCP or a PDCU-TCP. However,
when the TCP was evaluated as a spare, all TCP MTTRs were physically
changed in the UNIRAM input file. Therefore, the TCPs have an effect on
equivalent availability seemingly out of proportion to their criticality
rankings.
3.2.1 Insolar Sparing Sensitivity Results
Figures 3-4 and 3-5 show the effects of single ORU on-orbit sparing
on system availability and equivalent availability, respectively, for the
Insolar model. The significant ORUs for availability are the Alpha-PDT
and the power management controller (PMC). These ORUs, because of their
small quantity (2) and the fact that the EDS system depends on them for
operation, have the greatest probability of bringing the insolar power
generation system to a zero-output level. The scale on Figure 3-4 ranges
from 99.9217 percent to > 99.9999 percent, thus, the variation in
availability is relatively small compared with that shown in Figure 3-5.
In Figure 3-5 two major items become apparent. First, seven ORUs
have significant impact on insolar system equivalent availability:
Alpha-PDT, Beta-PDT, solar array electronics (SAEIec), sequential shunt
unit (SSU), dc switch unit (DCSU), thermal control plates (TCPs), and
righ£ and left photovoltaic blankets (RPVB and LPVB). Second, the first
five of these components (Alpha-PDT, Beta-PDT, SAEIec, SSU, and DCSU) have
the same amount of impact on _nsolar equlvalent availab_llty which a11ows
the possibility of trade-offs on EPS level of on-orblt sparing.
Trade-offs allow the possibility of taking other factors into account,
such as cost, weight, and volume. The high impact that sparing TCPs have
on system equlvalent avaJlabil_ty is due to the great number of TCPs in
the system; 136 TCPs were modeled in the full EPS system. Many insolar
system ORUs depend on TCPs for operation.
3.2.2 Eclipse Sparing Sensitivity Results
Figures 3-6 and 3-7 show the effects of single ORU on-orbit sparing
on system availability and equivalent availability, respectively, for the
eclipse model without charge effects. The Alpha-PDT and the PMC have the
greatest impact on system availability for the same reasons as for the
Insolar model. Variations in availability (Figure 3-6) are small compared
with variations in equivalent availability (Figure 3-7).
A comparison of Figure 3-5 with Figure 3-7 shows that there are
additional similarities between Insolar operation and eclipse operation
without charge effects. In this case, six ORUs and ancillary components
have significant impact on system equivalent availability: battery,
Alpha-PDT, DCSU, fault isolator, CDU, and TCPs. As with the insolar
system, the eclipse system without charge effects has several ORUs that
affect equivalent availability equally when they are spared on-orbit:
Alpha-PDT, DCSU, and CDU fault Isolator. The TCPs have a pronounced
effect again, due to their great number and their impact on the ability of
ORUs in the eclipse system without charge effects to operate.
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Figure 3-8 shows that the A]pha-PDTand PMCpresent the most
significant effects on aval]ability whenspared on-orblt. However, Figure
3-9 shows that effects on equivalent availability due to on-orbit sparing
of ORUsdiffer from those for Insolar (Figure 3-5) and eclipse without
charge effects (Figure 3-7) in two significant ways. First, there are now
effects due to insolation period components. The Beta-PDT, SSU, SAElec,
and RPVBand LPVBhave significant effects on eclipse operation. Second,
a greater significance is attached to the DCSUand CDUfault isolator,
since these ORUsare now taken into account during both the insolation and
eclipse periods of operation. Whenconsidering eclipse without charge
effects, this insolation dependencewas not apparent. In eclipse without
charge effects (Figure 3-7) a general trade-off for ORUon-orbit sparing
possibly allowed equally weighted choices between the A]pha-PDT, DCSU,and
CDUfault Isolator. Incorporating charge effects into the eclipse model
gave the DCSUand CDU/Fault Isolator ORUsgreater on-orbit sparing impact
than the Alpha-PDT (Figure 3-9) thus limiting the ORUon-orbit sparing
trade-off choices. The batteries have a more pronounced impact than do
the Alpha-PDTand other ORUs,because the battery MTBFis less than the
other ORUMTBFs(eight years versus ten years), and the batteries also
have an insolation operation dependence.
3.2.3 PMAD Sparing Sensitivity Results
The PMAD system power distribution control unit (PDCU) is the one ORU
that stands out because of its effect on PMAD system equivalent
availability when spared on-orbit (Figure 3-10). The total variation is
small, from 24.9950 kW (33.3271 percent) to 24.9998 kW (33.33l percent).
However, from a repair point of view, because there are 28 internal PDCUs,
the PDCU is the most likely ORU to need replacement; and from a
maintainability perspective, the PDCU should be evaluated as an on-orbit
spare.
3.2.4 On-Orbit Level of Sparinq
On the basis of the previous discussion and examination of the ORU
sparing analysis results, the following eight ORUs are considered the most
critical from a RAM perspective and are potential choices for on-orblt
spares:
• PMC - The PMC has the greatest effect on eclipse and insolar
system availability, as shown in Figures 3-4, 3-6, and 3-8.
Alpha-PDT - The Alpha-PDT has a significant effect on availability
and equivalent availability (Figures 3-4 through 3-9). There is
no redundancy of Alpha-PDTs, and a single point failure causes a
50-percent loss of EPS output power capability.
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TCP- The TCPs have a slgnlflcant impact on system equivalent
availability (Figures 3-5, 3-I and 3-9) because there are 136 oF
them in the total EPS system. On-orbit sparing of one TCP reduces
the MTTRs of all TCPs in the system until the first TCP failure
and the on-orbit spare is used. Because of the high number of
TCPs, the probabiIlty of random failure of a TCP is signiflcant.
SAEIec - A failure of an SAEIec ORU will result in the loss of
output power from one-half of a PV module. Eight SAEIec ORUs are
affected by a change in the MTTR.
• SSU - The reasoning for sparing this component is the same as that
for the SAEIec.
CDU - The reasoning for sparing this component is the impact of
the CDU on equlva]ent avafilability (Figures 3-7 and 3-9), when
considering charge effects during eclipse operation, should rank
the CDU as a more valuable on-orblt spare than the Alpha-PDT,
SAEIec, and SSU. When the CDU Is spared, a fault isolator is also
spared.
Beta-PDT - The reasoning for sparing this component Is the same as
that for the SAEIec.
PDCU - On-orbit sparing of the PDCU ORU is recommended because the
high ORU failure probability resulting from the large number (28)
of PDCUs in the gPS.
The following ORUs were not evaluated as potential choices for
on-orblt sparing:
• dc switch unit (DCSU)
• Right and left photovo]taic blankets (RPVB, L,PVB)
• Battery
The DCSU was not evaluated since it Is a complex series of DC remote bus
isolators, the failure of which may or may not cause a total failure of
the DCSU. On the other hand, the battery, RPVB and LPVB were not chosen
as on-orblt spares since these ORUs fail in a predictable manner due to
wearout and are therefore scheduled replacement items. All the other ORUs
were not considered as spares since they contributed little to system
avallabillty when spared on-orbit.
3.3 EPS RELIABILITY SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
The reliability sensitivity analyses were performed to provide an
indication of ORU MTBF importance with respect to EPS system operation.
ORU MTBF sensltlvity results are discussed only for those ORUs which
showed a signlflcant effect compared wlth the other ORUs in a given
model. The effects of ORU MTBF variation on availability have not been
included in thls discussion, because the range of aval]ability change is
3-19
small, as shown in Figure 3-11. The results of the reliability
sensitivity analyses closely follow those of the ORUsparing sensitivity
analyses.
Figure 3-12 presents the variation of insolar system equivalent
availability as the ORUreliability for all ORUsJs scaled from 0.7 to
5.0. Also shown in Figure 3-12 are the results of varying the MTBFsof
the eight critical ORUslisted in Section 3.2.4. Most of the system
equivalent availability changes result from varying the eight critical ORU
reliabilitles. Figure 3-13 shows the insolar ORUsthat have the most
significant effect on equivalent availability as their reliabilities are
varied -- the Alpha-PDT, Beta-PDT, SAElec, SSU, DCSU,and TCPs. These
ORUshave the samerelative significance, so their plots overlap. As with
Insolar ORUsparing, the TCPsyield the largest amount of equivalent
availability increase for the amount of reliability increase because of
the large number of ORUs affected by changes _n the TCPs (136).
The reliability for the eclipse system without charge effects was
also varied by scale factors from 0.7 to 5.0 (Figure 3-14). The results
were nearly identical to those for the Insolar system (Figure 3-12). The
single ORU MTBF variations (Figure 3-15) also show some similarities with
the Insolar system (Figure 3-13). However, In Figure 3-15 the CDU MTBF
varlat_on results include scaling the CDUs associated fault isolator.
Thus, its effect is about twice that of the Alpha-PDT, and the DCSU. For
example, at a scale factor of 2.0 the change in equivalent availability
due to a change in CDU fault isolator reliability is ].1009 percent and
that of the Alpha-PDT is 0.5488 percent. Hence, the Alpha-PDT, DCSU, CDU
(without fault isolator dependence), and fault isolator have nearly the
same effect on equivalent availability for the eclipse system without
charge effects.
Figures 3-16 and 3-17 show the effects of single ORU reliability
variation on equivalent availability for the eclipse with charge effects
system. The results closely parallel those for the sparing sensitivity
analysis if the doubling effect for the CDU fault isolator combination is
taken into account. The ORUs with the greatest variation are the
Alpha-PDT, CDU fault isolator, PDCU, TCPs, and the insolar components:
Beta-PDT, SAEIec, and SSU. The incorporation of charge effects increases
the MTBF for the CDU fault isolator and DCSU.
Due to the redundancy of power flow paths to critical loads in the
PMAD system, variations in ORU rellabilities had little effect on PMAD
system availabilty measures.
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EFFECTS OF SINGLE ORU MTBF VARIATION ON EQUIVALENT AVAILABILITY FOR THE
ECLIPSE MODEL WITH CHARGE EFFECTS (I of 2)
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EFFECTS OF SINGLE ORU MTBF VARIATION ON EQUIVALENT AVAILABILITY FOR THE
ECLIPSE MODEL WITH CHARGE EFFECTS (2 of 2)
3,4 COMPARISONFREL[ABI[.[TYANDMAINTAINABILITY
3,4.1 EPS Power Generatinq Systems
Figures 3-18 and 3-19 provide graphic comparisons of the effects of
design and operationa] variations of the power generating systems on
availability and equivalent availability respectively. Figures 3-20 and
3-21 present the same type of comparison for PMAD only
The scale captions for Figures 3-18 through 3-21 are defined as
follows:
MTTR = 1080: Basellne EPS ORU MTBF values were used (Section A.I
of Appendix A) with all ORU MTTRs = 1,080 hours (on-ground
sparing).
• MTTR = 6: Basellne EPS ORU MTBF values were used; all ORU
MTTRs = 6 hours (on-orbit sparing).
• Sparing: Baseline EPS ORU MTBF values were used; the eight
critical ORU MTTRs = 6 hours; all other ORU MTTRs = 1,080 hours.
• 2*All: All EPS baseline ORU MTBFs were increased by a scale
factor of 2; all ORU MTTRs _ 1,080 hours.
Sparing & 2*All: All EPS baseline ORU MTBFs were increased by a
scale factor of 2; the eight critical ORU MTTRs = 6 hours; all
other ORU MTTRs = ],080 hours.
• 2*Spare: The eight critical ORU baseline MTBFs were increased by
a scale factor of 2; all ORU MTTRs = 1,080 hours.
The data presented in Figure 3-]8 illustrate four major items Of
_nterest:
• The availability range is relatively small (from approximately
99.92 percent to approximately ]00 percent).
• There is no significant difference in the availabilities of the
three models for each system variation.
• Sparing all ORUs on-orbit essentially eliminates the possibility
of a zero-output state.
• Doubling the MTBFs of all ORUs has less effect on availability
than the two levels of sparing.
In Figure 3-19, four items of interest are apparent:
The amount of variation in equivalent availability between models
is significant, except for the case when all ORUs are spared
on-orblt.
3 -28
I
bO
,99.9999%
99.9800%
99.9600%
99.9400%
99.9200%
99.9000%
Availability
L
MTTR-1080 MTTR.6 Sparing 2*All Sparing&2*AII 2*Spare
System Variation
Legend -
Eclipse With Charge Effects
k%._ Insolar
Eclipse Without Charge Effects
FIGURE 3-18
EFFECTS OF DESIGN AND OPERATIONAl. VARIATIONS OF
POWER GENERATING SYSTEMS ON AVAIl,ABILITY
L,J
I
,99.9999%
95.0000%
90.0000%
85.0000%
80.0000%
75.0000%
Equivalent Availability
-1111
LJfL_/
_y_
MTTR-1080 MTTR-6
Legend:
I_B Eclipse With
Sparing
System
Charge Effects
2*All
Variation
Sparing&2*AII
[_ Eclipse Without Charge Effects
_ Insolar
FIGURE 3-19
EFFECTS OF DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL VARIATIONS OF
POWER GENERATING SYSTEMS ON EQUIVALENT AVAILABILITY
I_99.9999%
99.9900%
99.9800%
99.9700%
99.9600%
99.9500%
Path Availability Through PDCA-L3
MTTR-1080 MTTR-6 Sparing 2*All Sparing&2*AII 2*Spare
System Variation
EFFECTS
FIGURE 3-20
OF DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL VARIATIONS OF
PMAD SYSTEM ON PATH AVAIl.ABILITY
PDCA-L3 Average Power Capability
25.0000 kW
c,o
I
t_o
24.999O kW
24.9980 kW
24.9970 kW
24.9960 kW
24.9950 kW
MTTR-1080 MTTR-6 Sparing 2*All
System Variation
Sparing&2*AII 2*Spare
FIGURE 3-21
EFFECTS OF DESIGN AND OPERATIONAl, VARIATIONS OF
PMAD SYSTEM ON AVERAGE POWER CAPABILITY
• System variations of Insolar and ecllpse without charge effects
provide approximately the sameequivalent availability effects.
The inclusion of the probability of a full battery charge in
eclipse, through the use of charge effects, has significant impact
on system equivalent availability, except when the eight critical
ORUsare spared on-orblt and all ORUMTBFsare doubled or all ORUs
are spared on-orblt.
• Doubling all ORUMTBFshas less effect than sparing only the eight
critical ORUs.
3.4.2 Power Distribution System (PMAD)
In the PMAD system design and operational comparison of path
availability through PDCA-L3 (Figure 3-20), the following trends are
apparent:
• The variation in availability is relatively small (0.0l percent).
• Sparing all ORUs on-orblt essentially eliminates the possibility
of a zero-output state.
• Sparing eight critical ORUs provides nearly all the availability
change as sparing all ORUs on-orbit.
• Doubling the MTBFs of all ORUs has less effect on availability
than the two levels of sparing.
3.4.2.1 Equlvalent Availability
In Figure 3-21 all equivalent availability levels have been replaced
with their kilowatt average power equivalents, presenting the magnitudes
of variation in a more understandable form. The results are similar to
those of the power generating system comparisons, with one exception. The
scale over which the variations occur _s small (<5 watts). Although the
same trends are seen, this small scale of variation makes PMAD ORU
rellabil_ty enhancements unnecessary. However, due to the number of PDCUs
(28 internal to modules), the PDCUs are potential candidates for on-orblt
spares.
3.4.2.2 Architecture Comparisons
Figure 3-22 provides an indication of the availability variation
between the ring and radial PMAD architectures, as well as for the inner
keel distribution system. The availability of either internal
architecture is nearly the same and varies little, whether ORUs are spared
on-orblt or on-ground. The significant deviation with the outside PDCU is
due to modeling a single PDCU rather than a PDCA composed of two parallel
redundant PDCUs (Figure 3-2). When ORUs are spared on-orbit, the outside
PDCU availability approaches that of the internal PMAD. The same type of
results are shown in Figure 3-23 for PMAD system equivalent availability.
3-33
Availability
_99.9999%
CO
I
CO
99.5000%
99.0000%
98.5000%
98.0000%
97.5000%
97.0000%
MTTR--1080
Legend:
Ring
MTTR=6
Radial _ Outside PDCU
FIGURE 3-22
COMPARISON OF AVAILABILITY FOR THE PMAD MODEL CONFIGURATIONS
Equivalent Availability
33.3000%
33.1000%
32.9000%
L,J
I
U'_
32.7000%
32.5000%
Legend
MTTR--1080
Ring _ Radial
MTTR--6
Outside PDCU
FIGURE 3-23
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3.5 EPSINTEGRATEDSYSTEMEVALUATION
This section provides the results of the integration of the power
generating system models and the power distribution system inside the
alpha joints. Three cases were evaluated for each of the three models:
baseline (MTTR = I080), on-orbit sparing of all ORUs (MTTR = 6), and
sparing of the eight critical ORUs on-orbit. In each case the highest
PMAD output state was 33.3333 percent (25 kW) because of the use of a
25-kW output load on PDCA-L3. The difference between PMAD alone and the
integrated systems is the addition of output power states between 33.3333
percent and 0.0000 percent. These states lower system equivalent
availability slightly. The relatively low state probabilities between the
33.3333 percent level and the 0.0000 percent level are driven by the power
generating system redundancy. This redundancy significantly increases the
probability of states above 50.0000 percent generated output and thus
reduces the probability of those states below 50.0000 or 33.3333 percent.
In each case, the probability of falling below the minimum life-support
level of 12.5 kW increased slightly due to the effect of combining the
zero-output state probabilities of the PMAD with the generating system
state probabilities.
Table 3-4 presents the results of the EPS integrated system
evaluation for the integrated insolar and PMAD systems. As expected, the
baseline configurations have a slightly lower equivalent availability than
either of the sparing scenarios -- 33.29 percent versus 33.33 percent.
The average output capabilities (equivalent availability * 75 kW) vary
over a range of 24.9974 kW to 24.9646 kW (0.0328 kW or 32.8 W). Either
sparing scenario significantly reduces the probability of a zero-output
state.
Table 3-5 presents the evaluation results for integrated eclipse
without charge effects and the PMAD system. The average output
capabilities vary over a range of 24.9975 kW to 24.9698 kW (0.0277 kW or
27.7 W). Either sparing scenario significantly reduces the probability of
a zero-output state.
Table 3-6 presents the evaluation results for the integrated eclipse
with charge effects and the PMAD system. The average output capabilities
vary over a range of 24.9975 kW to 24.9341 kW (0.0634 kW or 63.4 W).
Either sparing scenario signlflcafltly reduces the probability of a
zero-output state.
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TABLE3-4
INSOLAR PERIOD STATE PROBABILITIES
POWER OUTPUT FROM PDCA-L3
OF
Output
State
Output State
Capability (%)
State
Probability
Output Power
Level (kW)
MTTR _: ],080
1 33.33 0.997308
2 31.83 0.000550
3 25.00 0.001061
4 24.69 0.000036
5 24.38 0.000001
6 12.50 0.000073
7 12.19 0.000001
8 0.00 0.000970
Equivalent Availability = 33.29%
Average Power Output Capability =
24.9975
23.8725
18.7500
18.5175
]8.2850
9.3750
9.1425
0.0000
24.9646 kW
MTTR = 6
1 33.33 0.999995
2 31.83 0.000000
3 25.00 0.000003
4 24.69 0.000000
5 24.38 0.000000
6 12.50 0.000000
7 12.19 0.000000
8 0.00 0.000003
24.9975
23.8725
18.7500
18.5175
18.2850
9.3750
9.1425
0.0000
Equivalent Availability = 33.33%
Averaqe Power Output Capability = 24.9974 kW
Sparing Eight Critical ORUs
1 33.33 0.999911
2 31.83 0.000060
3 25.00 0.000017
4 24.69 0.000001
5 24.38 0.000000
6 12.50 0.000001
7 12.19 0.000000
8 0.00 0.000008
Equivalent Availability _- 33.33%
Average Power Output._C_aa_gbi[_.[y__L__24_99]!_.kW - ...............
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24.9975
23.8"/25
18.7500
]8.5175
18.2850
9.3750
9.1425
0.0000
TABLE 3-5
EPS ECLIPSE PERIOD STATE PROBABILITIES OF POWER OUTPUT
FROM PDCA-L3 (WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS)
MTTR = 1,080
Output Output State State
State Capability (%) Probability
Output Power
Level (kW)
1 33.33
2 30.00
3 25.00
4 20.00
5 ]5.00
6 i0.00
7 5.00
8 0.00
Equivalent Avallabil_ty = 33.29%
Average Power Output Capability =
0.998222
0.000524
0.000209
0.000061
0.000012
0.000004
0.000000
0.000969
24.9975
22.5000
18.7500
15.0000
11.2500
7.5000
3.7500
0.0000
24.9698 kW
MTTR = 6
1 33.33 0.999998 24.9975
2 30.00 0.000000 22.5000
3 25.00 0.000000 18.7500
4 20.00 0,000000 15.0000
5 15.00 0.000000 ]1.2500
6 10.00 0.000000 7.5000
7 5.00 0.000000 3.7500
8 0.00 0.00000] 0.0000
Equlvalent Availability = 33.33%
Average Power Output Capability = 24.9975 kW
Spa[ing Eight Critical ORUs
1 33.33 0.999973 24.9975
2 30.00 0.000008 22.5000
3 25.00 0.000009 18.7500
4 20.00 0.000001 15.0000
5 15.00 0.000000 11.2500
6 10.00 0.000000 7.5000
7 5.00 0.000000 3.7500
8 0.00 0.000008 0.0000
Equivalent Availabillty = 33.33%
Average Power Output__Capabillty = 24.9972 kW
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TABLE3-6
EPSECLIPSEPERIODSTAT_PROBABILITIESOF POWER
OUTPUT FROM PDCA-L3 (WITH CHARGE EFFECTS)
MTTR =- 1,080
Output Output State State
State Capability (%) Probability
Output Power
Level (kW)
1 33.33
2 30.00
3 25.00
4 20.00
5 15.00
6 ]0.00
7 5.00
8 0.00
Equivalent Availabillty = 33.25%
Averaqe Power Output
0.991804
0.003766
0.002011
0.000945
0.000337
0.000133
0.000027
0.000977
Capability = 24.9341 kW
24.9975
22.5000
18.7500
15.0000
11.2500
7.5000
3.7500
0.0000
MTTR = 6
1 33.33
2 30.00
3 25.00
4 20.00
5 15.00
6 I0.00
7 5.00
8 0.00
Equivalent Ava_labillty _ 33.33%
Averaqe Power Output Capability_= 24.9975 kW
.999996
.000000
.000003
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000003
24
22
18
15
ii
7
3
0
Sparing Eight Critical ORUs
.9975
.5000
.7500
.0000
.2500
.5000
.7500
.0000
I 33.33 0.999894
2 30.00 0.000050
3 25.00 0.000035
4 20.00 0.000009
5 15.00 0.000002
6 i0.00 0.000001
7 5.00 0.000000
8 0.00 0.000008
Equivalent Availability = 33.33%
Averaqe Power Output Capabil_t_ = 24.9968 kW
24
22
18
15
ii
7
3
0
.9975
.5000
.7500
.0000
.2500
.5000
.7500
.0000
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The incorporation of charge effects had an impact. This is evident
when comparing the integrated results for eclipse with charge effects with
either the lnsolar or eclipse without charge effects results. The
intermediate states have increased probabilities and importance, which led
to the lower equlvalent availabilities (average output capabilities).
3.6 EPS FAILURE AND REPLACEMENT RATE ANALYSES
The failure rate calcu]atlon methodology defined in Section 2.6.2 was
used to calculate the overa]| system average annual ORU failure rates. As
a result of these calculations, it was determined that the baseline EPS
will have an expected ORU failure rate of approximately 35 ORUs and
ancillary components per year. The total number of ORUs and ancillary
components used in the calculation was 418, which _ncludes 136 TCPs, 40
DC-RBIs associated with the CDUs, and 20 fault isolators. Although 35
failures per year seems high, some of the ORU failures will not need
immediate attention (for example, a failure of one CDU DC-RBI does not
require immediate replacement, since the CDU DC-RBIs are dually
redundant), Thus the average annual repair [ate may be lower.
Failure rate calculations were also performed on the analyses results
used in Section 3.5, which varied ORU MTBFs. As expected, when all ORU
MTBFs are doubled the failure rate is cut by half, approximately 17 ORUs
per year. When the eight critlca] component MTBFs are exclusively
doubled, the failure rate drops to 29.
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CItAP'rI:<R FOUR
CONCI,US] ONS AND RKCOMMI<NI)ATI ONS
The Space Station E]ecLric Power System was modeled and a RAM
assessment was performed using the UNII_AM assessment methodo]oqy. As the
EPS design evolves, NASA Can use the resulting EPS models and evaluation
to assess EPS design changes on system RAM performance as the EPS design
evolves. The following sections present the specific conclusions and
recommendations that resulted From the initial 5:PS RAM assessments,
described in this report.
EPS Power Generation
From a RAM perspective, eight EPS ORUs accounted for most of the EPS
RAM changes when EPS ORU re]lability and maintainability parameters were
varied. These ORUs, considered crJtiCd] to EPS operation, and are listed
as follows:
• Alpha Joint Power and Data Transfer Assembly
• Beta GJmba] Power and Data Transfer Assembly
• Charge/Discharge Unit
• Power Distribution Control unir
• Power Management ControJler
• Sequential Shunt Unit
• So]ar Array Electronics Assembly
• Thermal Control Plate
These ORUs are possible candidates For on-orl)Jt sparing; however, further
analyses based on ORU cost, weight, and volume considerations must be
performed to determine which ORUs should be spared.
Table 4-] presents the equivalent availabilities and the
ava]iabil]ties for the system variations considered in this study. The
system variations are listed Jn order of descending system equivalent
availability. The equivalent availab.ility change among the system
4-]
variations is large (a maximum difference of 13.99 percent), and the
availabi]Ity change among the system variations is sma]] (a maximum
difference of 0.08 percent). EPS equivalent avallabl]ity is sensitive to
both ORU reliability and maintainability.
TABI,E 4-]
SYNOPSIS OF EPS ORU SPARING AND REI.IABILITY SENSI'['IVITY ANALYSIS
System Variation EA(%) A(%)
Insolar
Spare All ORUs
Double All ORU MTI_Fs and Spare Eight Critical ORUs
Increase All ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five
Spare Eight Crltlca] ORUs
Increase Eight Crltlca] ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five
Double All O_U MTBFs
Double Sight Critical ORU MTBFs
Baseline System Results
99.77 >99.99
98.08 >99.99
97.78 >99.99
96.20 >99.99
95.83 >99.99
94.53 99.98
93.74 99.98
89.35 99.92
Eclipse without Charge Effects
Spare All ORUs
Double All ORU MTBFs and Spare Eight Critical ORUs
Increase All ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five
Spare E_ght Critical ORUs
Increase Eight CritJca| ORU MTHFs by Factor of Five
Double A|| ORU MTBFs
Double Eight Critical ORU MTBFs
Baseline System Results
99.94 >99.99
98.49 >99.99
97.86 >99.99
96.96 >99.99
95.48 >99.99
94.70 99.98
93.23 99.98
89.58 99.92
Eclipse with Charge Effects
Spare All ORUs
Double All ORU MTBFs and Spare Eight Critical ONUs
Increase All ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five
Spare Eight Critical ORUs
Increase Eight Critical ORU MTBFs by Factor of Five
Double All ORU MTBFs
Double Eight CrJtlca] ORU MTBFs
Baseline System Results
99.85 >99.99
96.24 >99.99
94.69 >99.99
92.55 >99.99
89.04 >99.99
87.22 99.98
83.89 99.98
75.96 99.92
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The RAM assessment showed that there Js JJtt]e or no dJfference
between PDCAs when considering the availability of power from any given
PDCA in the PMAD system. The baseline avai|abi]ity of the PMAD system is
99.98 percent, but ORU on -orbit sparing and reliability changes increased
the avai]abillt V to greater than 99.99 percent. Since there are 28 PDCUs
Jn the manned core, the only PI_D ORU considered viable as a potential
on-orbit spare was the PDCU.
A baseline analysis of the inner keel power distribution system was
also performed. The availability of power from an inner keel PDCU was
97.90 percent when ORU MTTRs were ],080 hours: When a PDCU was spared
on-orbit, the availability of power from a PDCU on the inner keel
increased to 99.99 percent.
EPS Inteqrated Sys_te_
Table 4-2 presents the equivalent availabilities, the probabilities
of power ]eveis below minimum life-support levels, and the probabilities
of zero output states for the EPS integrated system analyses. Since the
PMAD system was modeled as delivering power to a perfectly available 25 kW
load (33.33 percent of 75 kW, which is the total system capacity), the
equivalent availability data are on a scale of 33.33 percent. EPS
integrated system analyses were also performed for sparing only the eight
critical ORUs on-orbit. The results of these analyses were the same as
the results for sparing all ORUs on-orbit (MTTR : 6). With no on-orbit
sparing of ONUs, there Js a finite probability that the EPS power output
will fall below minimum life-support levels.
The total number of ONUs used to mode] the EPS was 418. The expected
average annual failure rate is 35 ORUs per year.
'J'AB[,E 4-2
EPS IN'I'EGRA'I'EDSYSTEM RESUI,TS
l_-qu]v a-left}. ......... Pr-obab-.i i-it _}--(, 1_ ...... F_ooba-b]-l]- {y--o-f-- -
System
Combination
Avai labi li ty
(%)
l,ess Than Minimum
l.-i fe -Support
MTTR-],080 MTTR:6 MTTR:],080 MTTR-6
PMAD and Inso]ar 33.29 33.33
Zero Output
State
MTTR:],080 MTTR=6
PMAD and gcllpse 33.29
(No Charge Effects)
33.33
PMAD and Eclipse 33.25 33.33
..............................
O.00]0 <0.0O0] O.O0]O <0.0001
0.00]0 <0.0001 0.00i0 <0.0001
0.0015 <0.000] 0.00]0 <0.000l
.......................................
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Recommendations
As this study was performed, the following further analyses were
identified as necessary:
An analysis of the EPS, taking into consideration various
distributed power load scenarios should be performed. The initial
analysis used a single 25-kW load at the output of the dlstribution
system, but a subsequent evaluation would not only distribute the
single 25-kW load to other PDCUs in the manned core, but would also
account for the insolation period system load represented by the
EPS battery charge. If possible, load-shedding ranking factors
should be used to determlne the availability of power to each load
under the ranking criteria. U]tlmate]y, this study would provide
information on the EPS ability to supply power in various load
configurations.
An analysis incorporating the lifetime data associated with the
EPS batteries and photovo]taic arrays should be performed. This
analysis would center on the use of a distribution function, such
as the WeJbull, to determine yearly M']'L{Fvalues. The values would
then be used in several UNTRAM analyses to study the decrease In
sps performance as the battery packs and photovo]ta_c arrays
degrade with age. This analysis would also yield an expected
annual ORU failure rate that would increase as the lifetimes of
the batteries and photovoltaic arrays are reached.
RAM analyses of individual ORUs, taking Juto consideration the
parts makeup within the ORU, should be performed These analyses
wou]d provide possible output states and state probabilities for
the ORU. The states and state probabilities would then be
incorporated into a system analysis for a more precise indication
of system RAM performance using actual capabilities of selected
ORUs.
An ORU parts-type evaluation similar to a MJI.,HDBK-2IT_ (Ref. 2)
analysis should be performed on selected ORUs. This analysis
should include the previously identified e_ght critical ORUs. The
purpose of the analysis would be to establish more accurate
predictions of the ORU M'I'BFs.
Analyses specJ fic to selecting an optimum on -orbJ t level of ONU
spares for the I,',PSshould be performed. These analyses would
consider such constra:ints as: liPS RAM considerat.ions, ORU mass,
volume, cost to lift, and the requirements For ORU spares testing
while ORUs are on -orbi t.
An in--depth analysis of _IPS ma_ntainabi]_[y should be performed.
It should use expected ORU Failure rates and on-orbit sparing
scenarios as well as the proposed EPS intravehJcular activity (IVA)
and extravehicular activity (_:VA) budgets allowed for IEPS
maintenance. The ana]ys:is results would identify possible
maintenance strategies to trade fV;% and I_VA hours for degraded
44
levels of system performance arld would determine the adequacy of
the IVA and EVAbudgets as they relate to various levels of system
performance.
An EPStestabl]Jty ana]ys_s should be performed to determine if
the current ORUpackaging and test point distribution is adequate
to isolate faults to at least individual ORUs.
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APPENDIX A
MODELING INFORMATION FOR THE SPACE STATION ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
A.I ORUsUSSDIN THEANALYSIS
Table A-I lists the ORUsused in the RAM analysis of the Space
Station EPS, including the ORU names, model input file acronyms, and
associated rel_ability data.
TABLE A-I
ORUs USED fN THE SPACE STATION EI.ECTRIC POWER SYSTEM
UN] RAM MODELS
MTBF
ORU Name Basic Subsystem Component (Hours)
MTTR
(Hours)
Solar Array Right Blanket
Solar Array Left Blanket
Solar Array Mast Longeron
Solar Array Electron_cs Box
Sequential Shunt Unit
RPVB 131,400
LPVB 131,400
Longeron 99,999,999*
SAE]ec 87,600
SSU 87,600
0.01"
Beta Gimbal Subassemblies
Power/Data Transfer Subassembly
Bearing Subassembly
Drive Motor Subassembly
Controller
Beta-PDT
B-GimBrng
B-GimMtr
B-GmCntrlr
87,600
131,400
87,600
87,600
Alpha Joint Subassemblies
Power/Data Transfer Subassembly
Bearing Subassembly
Drive Motor Subassembly
Controller
Alpha-PDT
A-GimBrng
A-GlmMtr
A-GmCntrlr
87,600
131,400
87,600
87,600
Electrlca] Equipment Assembly Subassemblies
DC Switch Unit
DC/AC Inverter
Outboard Maln Bus Switching Unit
Power Distribution and Control Unit
DCSU
Inverter
OMBSU
PDCU
87,600
87,600
87,600
87,600
(continued)
A-I
TABLE A-1 (continued)
ORU Name Basic Subsystem Component
MTBF MTTR
(Hours) (Hours)
Electrical Equipment Assembly Subassemblies (continued)
Photovoltaic Source Controller
Charge/Discharge Unit
CDU dc Remote Bus Isolator
CDU Fault Isolator
Battery
PVSC 43,800
CDU 87,600
DC-RBI 87,600
Fault ISO 87,600
Battery 70,080
Power Management and Distribution System Subassemblies
Node Transformer
Power Distribution Control Unit
Outboard Main Bus Switching Unit
Main Bus Switch Unit
Node Switch Unit
Power Management Controller
Xfmr 131,400
PDCU 87,600
OMBSU 87,600
MBSU 87,600
NSU 87,600
PMC 43,800
Thermal Control System Subassemblies
Thermal Control Pump Unit
Thermal Control System Pipe Set
Thermal Control System Accumulator
Radiator Panel Assembly
Thermal Control Plates
Pump 280,320 --
Pipe Set 262,800 --
Accum 131,400 --
RadPnl 489,351 540
TCPs 131,400 --
*Default UNIRAM values to give ORU perfect availability
A.2 KEY ASSUMPTIONS PERTAINING TO THE SPACE STATION ELECTRIC POWER
SYSTEM UNIRAM MODEI.S
The assumptions used to develop the system ABDs for the EPS are
presented in the following subsections by the major system to which the
assumptions apply.
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A.2.1 EPS Assumptions
The following assumptions apply to the entire EPS:
• The ORU is the component level for UNIRAM modeling.
• ORU failures are independent.
• The MTBF values used for the EDS ORUs represent the relative
differences in failure rates between ORUs.
Nearly all actual MTTRs will be bounded between the 6 hour
(on-orbit ORU sparing) and the 45 day (ground ORU sparing) MTTRs
assumed in this study.
The outboard thermal control system pumps are powered by 400 Hz
ac synchronous motors, whlch ace powered, in turn, from the
inboard PV module PDCUs. The loss of both PDCUs results in the
loss of all thermal control systems on a station side, outboard
of the alpha joint.
The thermal control system reservoir is included in the thermal
control system fault tree because it uses a diaphragm as an
interface between N 2 gas and the refrigerant. The diaphragm
will be the critlca] failure point in the system. The reservoir
MTBF is assumed to be 15 years.
The thermal control system radiator panel assemblies are
constructed so that each panel has two separate, two-phase
tapered tube heat pipes. Both heat pipes must be penetrated to
fall a panel. The probability of meteoroids not disabling 3 of
the 12 panels over 30 years is about 0.99999938. Because of this
probability, meteoroid impact will not be taken into account in
the modeling results, and the panels of the radiator panel
assembly are assumed to not rail. However, each panel is secured
to the interface heat exchanger by a clamp assembly pressurized
by a GN 2 canlster. The GN 2 canister has an MTBF of 15 years,
and the clamp has an MTBF of 15 years. If either fails the panel
will have poor mechanical contact with the interface heat
exchanger for heat transfer, and the entire panel assembly can be
assumed to have failed. Over-capacity is designed into the
system such that I0 or more panel assemblies can take the full
heat load. A Markov process was used to determine the mean time
between failure of moving from a 12-panel up state to a 9-panel
up state. This process assumed an MTTR per assembly of 45 days
(1,080 hours). The MTBF to the 9-panel up state was calculated
as 489,351 hours (55.86 years). This MTBF was used as the
radiator panel basic subsystem MTBF.
• Wlth few exceptions, each ORU was modeled with its own thermal
control plate
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The inboard PVmodule thermal control system cools both outboard
main bus switch units (OMBSUs) for each side of the Space
Station. The loss of an inboard PV module TCS is assumed to
cause the loss of both OMBSUs and thus one side of the EPS.
There is only one pair of outboard power distribution control
units (PDCUs) for each side of the Space Station. Located on the
inboard PV modules, the PDCUs redundantly supply ac control power
to the PV modules. Consequently, the loss of the PDCUs on one
side results in the loss of all thermal control system pumps
outboard of the alpha joint on that side of the Space Station.
A.2.2 EPS Insolar UNIRAM Model
The following assumptions apply to the insolar UNIRAM model:
The beta gimbal assembly positioning ORUs have been separated
from the power and data transfer assembly. A derate
pseudocomponent is placed around the beta positioning basic
subsystem (Beta 2), corresponding to the power degradation after
45 days of positioning loss. The angular error after 45 days
w111 be 12.80 °, and total power degradation (Pd) will be
Pd = Pmax * c°s(12"80°)
Pd = Pmax * 0.975
In addition, a photovoltaic array angular error that leads to a
Pd = 0.99 * Pmax is not considered significant in terms of
power loss. This error corresponds to a 2.56 ° angular error, or
approximately nine days of positioning capability loss. This
nine-day period (216 hours) is inserted as surge time for the
beta glmbal positioning components basic subsystem.
A PVSC has control features which affect the positioning
capability of the beta gimbals on its side of the Space Station.
A PVSC derate has been incorporated to reflect the reduced power
capability due to beta positioning loss for 45 days (refer to
preceding assumption). In essence, this derate is a perfectly
available pseudo-component with a throughput capacity of 24.375%
(18.281 kw). This corresponds to 0.975 * the output power of one
PV module (18.75 kw). Also, each PVSC is modeled with a 216 hour
surge time for the same reason given in the preceding assumption.
The beta gimbal posJtlonJng motors are brushless dc motors
powered from the inboard PV module PDCUs. Loss of these PDCUs
removes positioning capability from all beta glmba] assemblies on
one side of the Space Station; however, loss of the PDCUs also
shuts down the thermal control system pumps. Since the loss of
these pumps is much more significant than the loss of beta
positioning, the loss of beta positioning resulting from the loss
of PDCUs is not modeled.
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The dc switch units(DCSUs) operate in a cross-connected manner
upon failure of a dc--to-ac inverter.
Onedc-to-ac inverter is capable of handling all of the output
power capability of a PV module.
• OMBSUscan be cross-connected.
The alpha joint was modeled as a beta gimbal because no alpha
joint design information was available.
The positioning and power transfer functions of the alpha joint
have been separated, as they have been with the beta gimbal. The
alpha joint can be manually repos_tioned to the single optimum
insolation period position upon loss of automatic positioning
capability. This positioning leads to an average power level,
over one-half orbit, of 23.87 kW. This power level is derived as
follows:
Power as a function of position P(pos) is:
P(pos) = Pmax* sln(O)
The average power (Pave) over one-half of the orbit is:
_/2
Pave = 2/_ * I Pmax * sin(e) dO
0
Pave = Pmax * 2/_ * r-cos(e)]
_/2
I
0
Pave = Pmax * 2/_ * [-cos(_/2) + cos(0)]
Pave = Pmax * 2/_
Pmax = 75 kW/2 = 37.5 kW
Pave = 23.87 kW = 31.83% of total power
The photovoltaic array mast has been modeled so that the loss of
one longeron will cause the loss of the mast and thus its
associated solar array wing. This is a basic subsystem composed
of three longerons nested below an "or" gate.
A.2.3 EPS Eclipse UNIRAM Model
The following assumptions apply to the eclipse UNIRAM model:
The dc switch units will operate in a cross-connected manner upon
failure of a dc-to-ac inverter. This mode of operation allows
maximum power output from a single inverter.
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The inboard PV module TCScools both OMBSUsfor each side of the
Space Station. The loss of an inboard PV module TCSis assumed
to cause the loss of both OMBSUs and thus one side of the EPS.
The loss of both photovoltaic source controllers in a module
results in the loss of the ability of that module to charge the
battery. After three full orbits, a battery will be fully
discharged. This three-orblt full discharge is incorporated into
the eclipse models as a 4.5-hour surge time. During the
insolation period, the PVSC loss has no effect on PV module
output.
Each PV module has five batteries, consisting or three battery
packs of 30 cells each, in series. Each battery pack has its own
thermal control plate. A battery will be modeled as a basic
subsystem consisting of one battery with an MTBF of eight years
and three battery pack thermal control plates (TCPs) nested under
an "or" gate. The batteries are modeled this way for two
reasons. When a battery pack fails the entlre battery will be
replaced; and, if one of the battery pack TCPs fails, the battery
will not be available for use.
The battery fault isolator, located in the charge/discharge unit
(CDU), will be modeled as a separate component with an MTBF of I0
years.
• The only part of the alpha joint to affect the eclipse operation
of the EPS is the power and data transfer subassembly.
A.2.3.1 Charqe Effect Basic Subsystems
Charge-effect basic subsystems are a recommended means to more
accurately represent the availability of the EPS during eclipse
operation. These basic subsystems are meant to account for the
availability of the ORUs required to fully charge the batteries. The use
of these charge-effect subsystems in the UNIRAM model has been a topic of
discussion throughout the duration of this study. The eclipse ABD was
evaluated with and without charge effects as a way of determining the
upper and lower bounds of EPS eclipse availability.
The availabilities of the ORUs required for charging the battery are
incorporated by first determining which ORUs are necessary to charge the
battery. The ORU positions in the charge path are considered, and the
ORUs are then combined in fault trees which represent the charge-effect
pseudocomponents. These pseudocomponents are then modeled. The ORUs
that affect the charging of a single battery are combined in charge i, as
shown in Section A.3. The ORUs that affect the ability to charge either
the top or bottom battery set in a pv module are combined in charge 2.
Finally, the ORUs that affect the ability of an entire PV module to
charge all batteries are combined in charge 3. The charge-effect mode]
is then assessed using the UNIRAM baseline run. The effective
charge-effect pseudocomponent MTBFs and MTTRs are obtained for charges i,
2, and 3 from the subsystem MTBF and MTTR values obtained from the
baseline run. In the eclipse model with charge-effects, these values are
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used to account for the availability of having a fully charged battery at
the beginning of the ecllpse.cycle.
Expected system aval]abillty during eclipse operation is the
conditional availability of the eclipse system, given that it is charged,
multiplied by the expectation of being charged. The expectation of being
charged is the expected availabillty of the charging components during
the insolation period, or:
AE = (ABIAc)A C
where
AE is the expected eclipse system availability.
(ABIA C) is the conditional availability of the eclipse system
glven that the batteries are fully charged
and
AC is the expected availability of the components involved in the
charge period.
Since the combination of these expectations is a product
relationship, it can be represented by a "series" configured ABD, such as:
(ABI C) AC
where (ABIA C) is the ex|st]ng eclipse system AHD without
charge-effects, and AC represents the availability of the components
associated with a battery charge. The availability is calculated using
the associated component MTBFs and MTTRs as determined by the UNIRAM
evaluation of the charge-effect model. Since multiplication is
distributive and commutative, AC can be broken into pieces and
distributed within (ABIAc). This means that the charge effect
components can be broken into subgroups and their associated charge
effects can be distributed within the eclipse system ABD.
There are ORUs which operate both during battery charge and
discharge periods. For example, the CDU operates during both charge and
discharge of the battery. Since the eclipse time base is exclusive of
the Insolar time base, and the ORUs are assumed to have exponential
failure distributions, the use of these ORUs in both the insolar and
eclipse models does not double account for the effect these ORUs have on
availability.
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And finally, for future modeling use:
The alpha joint charge effect pseudocomponent (Charge 4) is
incorporated into the models. It would be used to incorporate
the availability of the posJtionlng ORUs of the alpha joint
during charging operation.
A.2.4 EPS PMAD UNIRAM Models
The following assumptions apply to the PMAD UNIRAM models:
• Power to a PDCA does not flow through the PDCAs of a
non-associated module.
• The MBSUs are not cross-connected.
• A load can be supplied from either PDCU in its associated PDCA.
• Node transformers are considered separate, in that failure of one
transformer will not cause failure of the other.
• There are five PDCAs in the LAB module and five PDCAs in the HAB
module.
• Upon loss of control signals or control power, PDCUs fail in an
as-is condition.
PDCU failure is assumed catastrophic such that no power will be
supplied to its load and no power will flow through it to other
PDCUs.
• The Inner-manned core components are not cooled by thermal
control plates.
A.3 SPACE STATION ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM MODELING DIAGRAMS
The following subsections present the EPS system ABDs, functional
block diagrams, and basic subsystem fault trees used to evaluate the EPS
RAM characteristics. Section A.3.1 provides the Inso]ar UNIRAM model
diagrams: Section A.3.2 provides the eclipse model diagrams and
charge-effect diagrams; Section A.3.3 provides the PMAD ring architecture
diagrams; Section A.3.4 provides the PMAD radial architecture diagrams:
and Section A.3.5 provides the inner keel PDCU ABD diagram. The insolar
and eclipse models share many of the same subsystems. For this reason,
the common fault trees between them and the other models have only been
inserted into this report once. Therefore, Section A.3.1, the Insolar
model diagrams, contains nearly all of the fault tree diagrams and
Section A.3.2 contains only those fault trees that are unique to the
eclipse model.
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A.3.1 Insolar UNIRAM Model ABD and Fault Trees
The following index lists the nested subsystem breakdowns, ABDs, and
fault trees for the insolar power generation system. In general, the
modeling diagrams are ordered from left to right following the basic
subsystems on the Insolar ABD.
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A.3.2 Eclipse UNIRAM Model ABD, Fault Trees, and Charqe Effect Block
Diaqrams
The following section presents the modeling diagrams for the
eclipse UNIRAM model. As stated previously, fault trees for basic
subsystems that the eclipse model shares wlth the insolar model are
listed in the Insolar section. The index for the ecllpse model figures
follows.
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A.3.4 PMAD Radial Architecture Mode] ABD and Fault Trees
Figure A-31 presents a functional block diagram of the PMAD system
with a radial PDCU architecLure. Figure A-32 presents the ABD of the
PMAD system radial architecture that followed from F_gure A-31.
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/%.3.5 Inner Keel PDCU Model ABD
Figuce A-33 presents the ABD for the Innec keel power distribution
system
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A "50
• 0 _ 0
PV Mod Outbd
4 2
26 ]
28 1
pV(In+Out)
3 2
26 1
29 1
OMBSA
2 ]
13 2
PV Supply
4 6
14 1
15 1
24 1
28 l
3O 1
3] 1
PV Total
3 2
32 ]
32 1
Powe[ Manage
2 ]
16 2
Total System
2
33 1
34 ]
0
0
0
A -52
A.4.3 Charqe Effect UNIRAM _In__p_qt._.File
Charge Effect Mode]
0 0 0.0750
3
Charge I
]00 1 9
2
-1
0 ]
1
Battery
i 1 '10080 1 1080 0
Bat--TCP1
] 1 131400 1 1080
0 Bat -TCP2
1 1 131400 1 1080
0 Bat-TCP3
1 1 131400 1 1080
0 Fau]t Isolator
i 1 87600 1 1080 0
CDU
I 1 87600 i 1080 0
CDU-TCP
1 1 131400 1 1080 0
DC-RBI]
2 1 8"1600 1 1080 0
DC-RBI2
2 ] 8"1600 1 1080 0
Charge 2
I00 1 12 5
-I 0
-1 1
-1 1
-I i
-1 l
[,ongeron 1
2 ] 99999999 1 0.0] 0
Longeron 2
2 ] 99999999 ] 0.0] 0
Longeron 3
2 ] 99999999 i 0.0] 0
RPVB
3 1 131400 1 1080 0
SAElec
3 ] 87600 1 1080 0
SAE-TCP
3 1 131400 1 1080 0
I,PVB
3 1 131400 1 1080 0
SSU
4 ] 8"1600 1 1080 0
SSU-TCP
4 ] 131400 1 1080 0
A -53
BETA PD'F
1 1 87600 ] 1080 0
_SU
5 1 87600 1 1080 0
DCSU-TCP
5 1 131400 1 1080 0
Charge 3
100 1 13 9
-10
11
-12
13
-12
15
11
-17
-17
Pipsetl
3 ] 262800 1 1080 0
ACCUMI
3 1 131400 1 1080 0
TCPumpI
4 1 280320 1 108o 0
TCPump2
4 1 280320 1 1080 0
P_pset2
5 1 262800 1 1080 0
ACCUM2
5 1 131400 1 1080 0
TCPump3
6 1 280320 1 1080 0
TCPump4
6 i 280320 i 1080 0
RADPNI.
1 1 489351 1 540 0
PVSC i
8 1 43800 1 1080 0
PVSCl-'mP
8 ] 131400 ] 1080 0
PVSC2
9 1 43800 ] 1080 0
PVSC2-TCP
9 1 131400 1. 1080 0
1
Nest
43
11
21
31
0
0
0
A -54
A.4.d PMAD Rl_ngAyqhitecture UNIRAM Input File
CROSS-CONNECTS
0. 0. 0.0750
30
SS-XFMR1A
100310
XF'MRIA
0 ] ]31400. 1 ]080. 0
SS-XFMRIB
10031 0
XFMR]B
0 1 131400. 1 1080. 0
SS-XFMR3
100310
XFMR3
0 1 131400. 1 1080. 0
SS-XFMR4
10031 0
XFMR4
0 I 131400. 1 1080. 0
SS-NSU] A
35110
NSU ] A
0 I 87600. i 1080. 0
SS-NSU] B
35110
NSUIB
0 1 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-NSU3A
35110
NSU3A
0 1 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-NSU3B
35110
NSU3B
0 I 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-NSU/IA
35110
NSU4A
0 I 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS -MBSU I
100121
-I 0
MBSU I
1 I 8"/600. 1 1080. 0
MBSU ] -TC D
I ] 131400. 1 1080 0
SS -MBSU2
100121
-1 0
A -55
MRSU2
I ] 87600. 1 1080. 0
MBSU2-TCP
1 1 131400. 1 1080 0
SS-MBSU
I00 121
-1 0
MBSU3
] 1 87600. i 1080. 0
MBSU3-TCP
1 1 131400. 1 1080 0
SS-MBSU4
]00121
-1 0
MBSU4
l ] 87600. ] 1080. 0
MBSU4 -TCP
I ] 131400. 1 ]080 0
TCS
100142
-I 0
i ]
p_ peset
1 ] 262800. I 1080. 0
ACCUM
1 ] 131400. 1 1080. 0
PUMPl
2 ] 280320. 1 ]080. 0
PUMP2
2 ] 280320. 1 1080. 0
$S -RADPNL
1001 ] 0
RADPN1.
0 ] 489351. ] 540 0
SS -PDCUIA
1003 i0
PI)CU 1A
0 ] 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS- PDC U 1B
100310
PDSUIB
0 1 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-PDCU3A
100 3 ] 0
PDCU3A
0 ] 8"1600. 1 1080. 0
SS -PDCU3B
1003] 0
PDCU3B
0 1 87600. I ]080. 0
SS-PDCUI. ] A
10031 0
A -56
PDCUI.]A
0 ] 8"7600. 1 ]080. 0
SS-PDCU1,l B
100 3 1 0
PDCU[,IB
0 1 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-PDCUI,2A
100310
PDCUL2A
0 1 8'7600. I 1080. 0
SS--PDCUL2B
100 3 i 0
PDCUI,2B
0 ] 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS -PDCU[,3A
I00 3 I 0
PDCUL3A
0 ] 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-PDCUI,3B
10031 0
PDCUL3B
0 i 87600. I 1080. 0
SS-PDCUL4A
10031 0
PDCUL4A
0 ] 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS-PD(]UI.4B
100 3 1 0
P[XEUL4B
0 1 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS -PDCULSA
10031 0
P[)CUL5A
0 I 87600. 1 1080. 0
SS -PDCULSB
10031 0
PDCULSB
0 ] 8"/600. 1 1080. 0
SS -LOAD
10031 0
LOAD
0 ] 99999999. ] .01 0
2O
SUPPLY ]
4 3
2 1
6 1
10 1
SUPPLY 2
4 3
1 1
5 1
11 1
A -b'l
SUPPLY 3
4 4
3 ]
7 1
8 l
12 l
SUPPLY 4
4 3
4 l
9 1
13 l
RTOP
PDCUs
4 3
16 1
26 l
28 l
RBOT PDCUs
4 3
17 1
27 1
29 1
LTOP PDCUs
4 3
18 1
20 l
22 1
LBOT PDCUs
4 3
19 1
2] 1
23 1
CRJT PDCU
3 2
24 1
25 1
RT PATH T
4 2
3] l
35 l
RT PATH B
4 2
32 i
36 1
LFT PATH T
4 2
33 1
37 1
LFT PATH B
4 2
34 ]
38 1
-58
RT PATH
3 2
40 ]
4] 1
LFT PATH
3 2
42 1
43 1
PATHS COM
3 2
44 1
45 1
DUAL TCS
2 1
14 2
TCS/RAD
4 2
47 1
]5 1
MOD TCS
3 2
48 1
48 1
LOAD PDC;%
4 4
30 1
39 1
46 1
49 1
0
0
0
;%-59
A.4.5 PMAD Radial Architecture UNIRAM Input File
0 0 0.0750
8
SS-XFMR
1003] 0
X FMR
0 1 131400 1 1080 0
SS-MBSU
100 1 21
-1 0
MRSU
I 1 87600 ] 1080 0
MBSU-TCP
1 ] 131400 1 ]080 0
SS-NSU
35110
NSU
0 ] 87600 ] 1080 0
SS-RBI
35110
RBI
0 ] 8"1600 ] 1080 0
SS-PDCU
100 3 ] 0
P[)CU
0 ] 87600 ] ]080 0
TCS
1001 42
-] 0
1 1
PJpeset
1 ] 262800 l 1080 0
ACCUM
] ] 131400 1 1080 0
TC Pump 1
2 ] 280320 1 1080 0
TCPump2
2 ] 280320 1 1080 0
SS-Radpn]
]001 ] 0
Radpn]
0 ] 48935] 1 540 0
SS-Load
1003] 0
Load
0 i 99999999 ] 0.0] 0
8
PDCA
2 ]
52
Path
4 4
1 ]
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
A -6]
d

A.4.6 Inner Keel UNIRAM Input File
Inner Keel Model
0 0 0.0750
4
SS-MBSU
i00 1 2 1
-i 0
MBSU
1 1 87600 I 1080 0
MBSU-TCP
1 ] 131400 1 1080 0
SS-OPDCU
I00 3 2 1
-i 0
OPDCU
1 1 87600 1 1080 0
OPDCU-TCP
1 ] 131400 1 1080 0
TCS
i00 1 4 2
-i 0
1 1
P_ peset
1 1 262800 1 1080 0
ACCUM
1 1 131400 1 1080 0
TCPumpl
2 1 280320 1 1080 0
TCPump2
2
1 280320 1 1080 0
SS-Radpnl
100 1 1 0
Radpnl
0 1 489351 1 540 0
6
Path 1
42
1 1
2 1
Path l&2
32
1 1
51
2*TCS
2 ]
32
TCS/RAD
42
41
7 1
A-63
APPENDIXB
SPACESTATIONELECTRICPOWERSYSTEM
TABULARDATARESUH'S
APPENDI× B
SPACE STATION EI,ECTRIC POWER SYSTEM TABULAR DATA RF;SUI.TS
Appendix B contalns the tabulated data compiled durlng the UNIRAM
RAM analysis of the Space Station Electric Power System.
tables are listed:
Table
Number
B-I
B-2
B-3
B-4
B-5
B-6
B-7
B-8
B-9
B-10
B-11
B-12
B-13
The following
PMAD Baseline Results for Path Reliablllt¥ to Each PDCA
Space Station EPS Baseline Results
Insolar Baseline System Output States
Insolar Component Critical_ty Ranking
Eclipse Without Charge Effects Baseline System Output
States
Ecl_pse With Charge Effects Baseline System Output
States
Ncllpse Component CrltJcal]ty Ranking Without Charge
Effects
Eclipse Component Criticality Ranking with Charge
Effects
PMAD PDCA-I.3 Baseline System Output States
PMAD PDCA-L3 Component Criticality Ranking
Insolar Component Data change Results MTTR Change
from 1,080 to 6 hours
Scllpse Component Data Change Results MTTR Change
from ],080 to 6 hours Without Charge Effects
Eclipse Component Data Change Results MTTR Change
from 1,080 to 6 hours With Charge Effects
Page
Number
B-3
B-4
B--5
B-7
B-8
B-9
B-IO
B-ll
B--12
B-13
B-14
B-15
B-16
B-I
Table
Number
B-14
B-15
B-16
B-17
B-18
B-19
B-20
B-2I
B-22
B-23
B-24
B-25
B-26
B-27
B-28
B-29
B-30
B-31
PMAD PDCA-L3 Component Data Change Results (MTTR
Change from ],080 to 6 hours)
Variation of Inso]ar Reliability with MTBF Scale
Factor
Insolar Component MTBF Sensitivity Analysis
(MTTR = ],080)
Variation of Eclipse Reliability with MTBF Scale
Factor Without Charge Effects
Eclipse Component MTBF Sensitivity Analysis
(MTTR = ],080) Without Charge Effects
Variation of Eclipse Rellab_]Ity With MTBF Scale
Factor (With Charge Effects)
Eclipse Component MTBF Sensitivity Anaiysls
(MTTR = ],080) With Charge Effects
Variation of PMAD PDCA-L3 Reliability W_th MTBF
Scale Factor
PMAD PDCU MTBF Sensitivity Analysis (MTTR = 1,080)
Insolar System Design and Operational Comparison
Eclipse System Design and Operational Comparison
Without Charge Effects
Eclipse System Design and Operational Comparison
Wlth Charge Effects
PMAD System Design and Operational Comparison
PMAD Model Configuration Comparison
EPS Inso].ar Period State Probabilities of Power Output
From PDCA-L3
EPS Eclipse Period State ProbabJllties of Power Output
From PDCA--I,3 Without Charge Effects
EPS Eclipse Perod State Probabilities of Power Output
From PDCA-L3 With Charge Effects
Baseline Space Station EPB Expected Average Annual ORU
Failure Rate
Page
Number
B -17
B-18
B-19
B-22
B-23
B-26
B-27
B-30
B-31
B-32
B-33
B-34
B-35
B-36
B-37
B-38
B-39
S-40
B-2
TABLEB-I
PMADBASELINERESULTSFORPATHREL[ABIt,fTYTOEACHPDCA
PDCA
PDCA-NI
PDCA-N3
PDCA-L]
PDCA-L2
PDCA-L3
PDCA-L4
PDCA-L5
A EA FOR EFOR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
99.9828
99.9825
99.9818
99.9814
99.9813
99.9816
99.9821
33 3276
33 3275
33 3273
33 3271
33 3271
33 3272
33 3274
Average
Power
(Kw)
0.01"72 66.6724 24.9957
0.0175 66.6725 24.9956
0.0182 66.6727 24.9955
0.0186 66.6729 24.9953
0.018; 66.6729 24.9953
0.0184 66.6728 24.9954
0.0179 66.6726 24.9956
A :
EA :
FOR :
EFOR:
Availability
Equ_va]ent Ava_labl]Ity
Forced Outage Rate
Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
B-3
TABLEB-2
SPACESTATIONEPSBASELINERF.SU[.TS
Model
Equivalent
Equivalent Forced Outage Forced Outage
Availability AvailabJllty Rate Rate(%) (%) (%) (%)
Insola[ 99.9217
Eclipse 99.9218
(without charge effects)
Eclipse 99.9210
(with charge effects)
PMAD/PDCA-L3 99.9813
89.3472 0.0783 10.6528
89.5751 0.0782 10.4249
75.9550 0.0"/90 24. 0450
33.3271 0.0187 66.6729
INSOLAR
TARI,E B-3
BASEI,INE SYSTEM OUTPUT STATES
Plant
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
lO
ii
12
13
14
15
16
]7
]8
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
3]
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Output State
Probability
39.3899%
5.3547%
0.43]6%
0.0224%
0.0008%
0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%
0.00O0%
30.]812%
3.5900%
0.2480%
0.0107%
0.0003%
0.0000%
0.0O00%
O.OOOO%
2.4162%
0.1642%
0.0077%
0.0002%
0.0000%
10.4130%
1.061"1%
0.0613%
0.0021%
0.0000%
0.0000%
O.OO00%
0.9256%
0.0472%
0.0015%
0.0000%
0.0371%
2.0964%
0.1781%
0.0083%
0.0002%
0.00O0%
0.00O0%
0.1421%
Output
Capability
100.00%
99.69%
99.38%
99.06%
98.'15%
98.44%
98.]3%
97.81%
97.50%
87.50%
87.19%
86.88%
86.56%
86.25%
85.94%
85.63%
85.31%
81.83%
81.52%
81.21%
80.89%
8O.58%
"15.00%
74.69%
74.38%
74.06%
73.75%
73.44%
73.]3%
69.33%
69.02%
68.71%
68.39%
63.66%
62.50%
62.]9%
61.88%
61.56%
61.25%
60.94%
56.83%
Days/
Year
Power (MW)
Output
143.77
19.54
1.58
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
110,16
13.10
0.91
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.82
0.60
0.03
0.00
0.00
38.0l
3.88
0.22
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.38
0.I/
0.01
0.00
0.14
7,65
0.65
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.52
0.0"150
0.0748
0.0745
0.0743
0.0741
0.0738
0.0736
0.0734
0.0731
0.0656
0.0654
0.0652
0.0649
0.0647
0.0645
0.0642
0.0640
0.0614
0.0611
0.0609
0.0607
0.0604
0.0563
0.0560
0.0558
0.0555
0.0553
0.0551
0.0548
0.0520
0.0518
0.0515
0.0513
0.04'1"1
0.0469
0.0466
0.0464
0.0462
0.0459
0.0457
0.0426
B-5
(Continued)
TABLEB--3 (continued)
Plant
State
Output State
Probability
Output
Capability
Days/
Year
Power (MW)
Output
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
6O
61
0.0048%
0.0001%
2.0530%
0.1395%
0.0063%
0.0001%
0.0O00%
0.0099%
0.OO02%
0.7060%
0.0360%
0.0011%
0.0000%
0.0550%
0.1061%
0.0036%
0.0001%
0.00"13%
0.0001%
0.0783%
56.52%
56.21%
50.00%
49.69%
49.38%
49.06%
48.75%
44.33%
44.02%
3"1.50%
37.]9%
36.88%
36.56%
3].83%
25.00%
24.69%
24.38%
12.50%
12.]9%
O.0O%
0.02
0.00
7.49
0.51
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
2.58
0.13
0.00
0.00
o.20
0.39
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.29
0.0424
0.0422
0.03"15
0.0373
0.03"10
0.0368
0.0366
0.0332
0.0330
0.0281
0.0279
0.0277
0.0274
0.0239
0.0188
0.0185
0.0183
0.0094
0.0091
0.0000
B-6
TABi,E B4
INSOLAR COMPONENT CRITICA[,ITY RANKING
Subsystem Component Definitlon
Ranking
Factor
Alpha I Alpha-PDT
Betal Beta PDT
SS-SSU SSU
SS-DCSU DCSU
PVSola[ SAE]ec
PVSolar RPVB
PVSo]ar SAE-TCP
PVSo]ar LPVB
SS-SSU SSU-TCP
SS-DCSU DCSU-TCP
Alpha 2 A-GmCntrir
Alpha 2 A--G1mBrnq
SS-RadPn] Radpnl
Manage 1 PMC
SS-OMBSU OMBSU
SS-PDCU PDCU
SS-_NVERT Inverter
SS-OMBSU OMBSU--_P
SS-PDCU PDCU-TCP
SS-INVERT Invt-TCP
BETA 2 B-GmCntrlr
TCS Accum
BETA 2 B-G1mBrng
TCS PlpeSet
AI.PHA 2 A-G_mMtr]
AI.PHA 2 A-G1mMtr2
SS-PVSC PVSC
SS-PVSC PVSC-TCP
BETA 2 B-GimMtrl
BETA 2 B-G_mMtr2
TCS TC Pump]
TCS TC Pump2
SS-PV Mast Longeron]
SS-PV Mast Longeron2
SS-PV Mast Longeron3
BetaDerate BYPASS
PVSCDerate BYPASS
A|phaDerate BYPASS
Note: TCP --:Thermal
Alpha Joint Power Data Transfer Assembly
Beta Gimbal Power Data Transfer Assembly
Sequential Shunt Unit
DC Switch Unit
Solar Array Electronics Assembly
Right Photovo]taic Blanket
Solar Array Electronics TCP
Left Photovo]talc Blanket
Sequential Shunt Un_t-TCP
DC Switch Unit-TCP
Alpha Joint Controller
Alpha Joint Bearing
Radiator Pane] Assembly
Power Management Controller
Outboard Main Bus Switching Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
AC to DC Inverter
Outboard Main Bus Switching Un_t-TCP
Power Distribution Control Unlt-TCP
AC to DC Inverter-TCP
Beta Gimbal Controller
Thermal Control System Accumulator
Beta Gimba] Bearing
Thermal Control System P_peset
Alpha Jolrlt Motor
Alpha JoJnt Motor
Photovo]ta_c Source Controller
PhotovoltaJc Source Contro]]er-TCP
Beta Gimba] Motor
Beta G_mbal Motor
Thermal Control System Pump
Thermal Control System Pump
PV Mast Longeron
PV Mast [.ongeron
PV Mast l,ongeron
Control Plate
.]014
.0888
.0888
.0888
.0888
.7258
.7258
.7258
.7258
.7258
.3360
.2240
.]475
.0518
.0306
.0306
,0304
.0233
.0233
.0232
.0218
.Oil7
.0145
.0ll0
.0040
.0040
.0013
.0006
.0002
.0002
.000]
.0001
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
B-7
TABLE B-5
ECLIPSE WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS BASEI.INE SYSTEM OUTPUT STATES
Plant
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
Output State Output Days/ Power (MW)
Probability Capabll_ty Year Output
19.1128%
28.82]8%
22.4706%
13.'1810%
7.1631%
3.38]0%
1.4891%
0.5826%
0.2]30%
0.072]%
1.2661%
0.9443%
0 3"193%
0 1641%
0 0524%
0 0209%
0 0061%
0 00]2%
0 0004%
0 O000%
0.0782%
100.00% 69.'16 0.0750
95.00% 105.20 0.0713
90.00% 82.02 0.0615
85.00% 50.30 0.0637
80.00% 26.15 0.0600
"15.00% 12.34 0.0563
70.00% 5.44 0.0525
65.00% 2.13 0.0488
60.00% 0.78 0.0450
55.00% 0.26 0.0413
50.00% 4.62 0.03'15
45.00% 3.45 0.0338
40.00% 1.38 0.0300
35.00% 0.60 0.0263
30.00% 0.19 0.0225
25.00% 0.08 0.0188
20.00% 0.02 0.0150
15.00% 0.00 0.0113
10.00% 0.00 0.00"15
5.00% 0.00 0.0038
0.00% 0.29 0.0000
B-8
TABLEB-6
ECLIPSEWITHCHARGEFFECTSBASEI,[NESYSTEMOUTPUTSTATES
Plant
State
Output State Output Days/
Probability Capab_l_ty Year
Power (_)
Output
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
]0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
2.1545%
6.7433%
11.3107%
14.7591%
15.7565%
14.3823%
11.6384%
8.3777%
5.4586%
3.2362%
2.1613%
].5166%
0.9783%
0.6655%
0.3767%
0.201I%
0.0945%
0.0337%
0.0133%
0.0027%
0.0790%
100.00%
95.00%
90.00%
85.00%
80.00%
15.00%
70.00%
65.00%
60.00%
55.00%
50.00%
45.00%
40.00%
35 00%
30 00%
25 00%
20 0O%
15 00%
I0 00%
5 00%
0 00%
I.
24.
4].
53.
57.
52.
42.
30.
19.
Ii.
7.
5.
3.
2
]
0
0
0
0
0
0
86
61
50
87
51
50
48
58
92
8]
89
54
57
43
38
'13
34
12
05
Ol
29
0.0150
0.0713
0.06'15
0.0637
0.0600
0.0563
0.0525
0.0488
0.0450
0.0413
0.03"15
0.0338
0.0300
0.0263
0.0225
0.0]88
0.0150
0.0113
0.00"15
0,0038
0.0000
B-9
TABLE B-7
ECLIPSE COMPONENT CRITICALITY RANKING WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS
Subsystem Component Definition
Ranking
Factor
SS-Battery
ALPHA-PDT
SS-DCSU
SS-FaultIs
SS-CDU
SS-Battery
SS-Battery
SS-Battery
SS-DCSU
SS-CDU
SS-Radpn]
SS-PVSC
Manage 1
SS-PVSC
SS-PDCU
SS-OMBSU
SS-Invert
SS-OMBSU
SS-PDCU
SS-Invert
TCS
SS-CDU
SS-CDU
TCS
TCS
TCS
Charge 1
Charge 2
Charge 3
Charge 4
Battery Battery
ALPHA ] Alpha Joint Power Data Transfer Assembly
DCSU DC Switch Unit
Fault Iso CDU Fault Isolator
CDU Charge/Discharge Unit
Bat-TCP] Battery-TCP
Bat-TCP2 Battery-TCP
Bat-TCP3 Battery-TCP
DCSU-TCP DC Switch UnJt-TCP
CDU-TCP Charge/Discharge Un_t--TCP
Radpnl Radiator Panel Assembly
Pvsc Photovoltaic Source Controller
PMC Power Management Controller
PVSC-TCP Photovo]taic Source Controller-TCP
PDCU Power Distribution Control Unit
OMBSU Outboard Main Bus Switching Unit
Inverter AC to DC Inverter
OMBSU-TCP Outboard Ma_n Bus Switching UnJt-TCP
PDCU-TCP Power Distribution Control Un_t-TCP
Invt-TCP AC to DC Inverter-TCP
ACCUM Thermal Control System Accumulator
DC-RBII Charge/D_scharge Unit
DC-RBI2 Charge/D_scharge Unit
PipeSet Thermal Control System Pipeset
TC Pump] Thermal Control System Pump
TC Pump2 Thermal Control System Pump
BattCE Battery Charge Effects
PV-MOD-CE2 Partla] PV Module Charge Effects
PV-MOD-CE3 Full PV Module Charge Effects
AlphaJntCE Alpha Joint Charge Effect
].3803
1.1043
].1043
1.1042
1.1042
0.7361
0.7361
0.7361
0.736]
0.736]
0.1481
0.0854
0.0519
0.0399
0.0307
0.0307
0.0307
0.0234
0.0234
0.0234
0.0178
0.0133
0.0133
0.0111
0.0001
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Note: TCP = Thermal Control Plate
B-]O
TABLE B-8
ECLIPSE COMPONENT CR]TrCAI,VFY RANKING WITH CHARGE EFFECTS
Subsystem Component Definition
Ranking
Factor
Charge 2 PV-MOD--CE2
Charge ] BattCE
SS-Battery Battery
A].phal Alpha--PDT
SS-Faultls Fault Iso
SS-DCSU DCSU
SS--CDU CDU
SS-DCSU DCSU-TCP
SS-Battery Bat-TCP]
SS-Battery Bat-TCP2
SS-Battery Bat-TCP3
SS-CDU CDU-TCP
Charge 3 PV-MOD-CE3
SS-Radpn] Radpn]
SS-PVSC PVSC
Manage ] PMC
SS-PVSC PVSC-TCP
SS-Invert Inverter
SS-PDCU PDCU
SS-OMBSU OMBSU
SS-OMBSU OMBSU-TCP
SS-PDCU PDCU-TCP
SS-Invert Invt-TCP
TCS ACCUM
SS-CDU DC-RBI1
SS-CDU DC-RBI2
TCS Plpeset
TCS TC Pump]
TCS TC Pump2
Charge 4
Partial PV Module Charge Effect
Battery Charge Effect
Battery
Alpha Joint Power Data Transfer Assembly
CDU Fault Isolator
DC Switch Unit
Charge/D_scharge Unit
DC Switch Un_t-TCP
Battery-TCP
Battery-TCP
Battery-TCP
Charge/Discharge Un_t-TCP
Full PV Module Charge Effect
Radiator Panel Assembly
Photovo]talc Source Controller
Power Management Controller
Photovo]taic Source Contro]]er-TCP
AC to DC Inverter
Power Distribution Control Unit
Outboard Main Bus Switching Unit
Outboard Main Bus Switching Unit-TCP
Power D_str_bution Control Unit-TCP
AC to DC Inverter-TCP
Thermal Control System Accumulator
Remote Bus Isolotor
DC Remote Bus Isolator
Thermal Control System P_peset
Thermal Control System Pump
Thermal Control System Pump
AlphaJntCE Alpha Jolnt Charge Effect
7.]495
5.7217
1.1704
0.9364
0.9363
0.9363
0.9363
0.6242
0.6242
0.6242
0.6242
0.6242
0.]'132
0.]256
0.0724
0.0440
0.0338
0.0260
0.0260
0.0260
0.0]98
0.0198
0.0198
0.0151
0.o113
0.0113
0.0094
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Note: TCP =-Thermal Control Plate
B-]I
TABI,E B-9
PMAD PDCA-L3 BASE[,[NE SYSTEM OUTPUT STATES
Plant
State
Output State Output Days/
Probability Capability Year
Powe[ (MW)
Output
1 99.9813% 33.33% 364.93 0.0250
2 0.0187% 0.00% 0.07 0.0000
B-12
TABLF B-10
PMAD PDCA-L3 COMPONENT CRITfCAL]TY RANKING
Subsystem Component Defini tlon
Ranking
Factor
SS-PDCUL3A PDCUL3A
SS-PDCUL3B PDCU[,3B
SS-NSU1A NSU]_
SS-NSU1B NSUIR
SS-MBSU] MBSU]
SS-MBSU2 MBSU2
SS-PDCUL5A PDCUL5A
SS-PDCUI.5B PDCUI,5B
SS-NSU4A NSU4A
SS-MBSU4 MBSU4
SS-PDCUIA PDCU]A
SS-PDCUIB PDCUIB
SS-PDCU3B PDCU3B
SS-PDCULIB PDCUI,IR
SS-PDCUL2B PDCU[.2B
SS-PDCUL4A PDCUL4A
SS-PDCUL4B PDCUL4B
SS-NSU3A NSU3A
SS-NSU3B NSU3B
SS-MBSU3 MBSU3
SS-PDCU3A PDCU3A
SS-PDCUL]A PDCUI.IA
SS-PDCUL2A PDCUI,2A
SS-XFMRIA XFMRIA
SS-XFMR]B XFMRIB
SS-XFMR4 XFRM4
SS-MBSUI MBSU]-TCP
SS-MBSU2 MBSU2-TCP
SS-MBSU4 MBSU4-TCP
SS-XFMR3 XFMR3
SS-MBSU3 MBSU3-TCP
SS-RADPNI, RADPNI.
TCS ACCUM
TCS Plpeset
TCS TC Pump]
TCS TC Pump2
SS-LOAD LOAD
Power Distribution Control Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Node Switching Unit
Node Switching Unit
Main Bus Switching Unit
Main Bus Switching Unit
Power D_strlbution Control Unit
Power DistrlbutJon Control Unit
Node Switching Unit
Main Bus Switching Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Power D1strJbutlon Control Unit
Power D1stribution Control Unit
Power Distrlbutlon Control Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Power Distributlon Control Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Node Switching Unit
Node Switching Unit
Main Bus Switching Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Power Distribution Control Unit
Node Transformer
Node Transformer
Node Trans[ormer
Main Bus Switching Unlt--TCP
Maln Bus Switching Unit-TCP
Main Bus Switching Unlt-TCP
Node Transfformer
Main Bus Switching Unit
Radiator Pane] Assembly
Thermal Control System Accumulator
Thermal Control System
Thermal Control System Pump
Thermal Control System Pump
Perfectly Available 25 Kw Load
0049
0049
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0002
0001
000]
.000]
000]
O001
0001
0001
O00l
0001
0000
0000
0000
0000
,0000
Note: TCP = Thermal Control Plate
........................
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TABLE B-If
INSOLAR COMPONENT DATA CHANGE RESULTS MTTR CHANGE FROM 1,080 TO 6 HRS
Component Single Component Multiple Component
A EA FOR EFOR A EA FOR
% % % % % % %
EFOR
%
Baseline
1 ALPHA PDT
2 BETA PDT
3 SAEIec
4 SSU
5 DCSU
6 TCPs
7 RPVB & I,PVB
8 A-GmCntrlr
9 A-GimBrng
10 Radpn]
ii PMC
12 OMBSU
13 PDCU
14 IN_VERTER
15 B-GmCntrlr
16 ACCUM
17 B-OmBrng
18 Pipeset
19 A-GimMtr] &
20 PVSC
21B-G]mMtrl &
22 TCPump] & 2
2
2
99.9217 89.3472 0.0783 10.6528 99
99.9416 90.4425 0.0584 9.55"75 99
99.92]8 90.4300 0.0782 9.5700 99
99.9217 90.4300 0.0783 9.5700 99
99.9218 90.4300 0.0782 9.5700 99
99.9218 90.4300 0.0782 9.5700 99
99.9232 91.6020 0.0768 8.3980 99
99.9218 90.7967 0.0782 9.2033 99
99.9217 89.68]3 0.0783 10.3187 99
99.9217 89.5700 0.0783 10.4300 99
99.9246 89.493] 0.0754 10.5069 99
99.9795 89.3989 0.0205 10.6011 99
99.9227 89.3777 0.0773 10.6223 99
99.9227 89.3777 0.0773 10.6223 99
99.9217 89.3773 0.0783 10.6227 99
99.9216 89.3690 0.0784 10.6310 99
99.9220 89.3649 0.0780 10.6351 99
99.9217 89.3618 0.0783 10.6382 99
99.9219 89.3582 0.0781 10.6418 99
99.9217 89.3512 0.0783 10.6488 99
99.9217 89.3485 0.0783 10.6515 99
99.9216 89.3474 0.0784 10.6526 99
99.9217 89.3473 0.0783 10.6527 99
A : Availability
EA : Equiva]ent AvaJ]ability
FOR : Forced Outage Rate
EFOR: Squivalent Forced Outage Rate
92]7 89.3472
9416 90.4425
9416 91.5386
9416 92.6476
9416 93.7698
9416 94.9054
9418 97.2982
9418 98.8744
9418 99.3081
9418 99.6008
9421 99.7638
9999 99.8216
.9999 99.8365
.9999 99.8514
.9999 99.8663
.9999 99.8911
.9999 99.9110
.9999 99.927";
.9999 99.9302
.9999 99.9356
.9999 99.9366
.9999 99.9368
.9999 99.9368
0.0783
0.0584
0.0584
0 0584
0 0584
0 0584
0 0582
0 0582
0 0582
0 0582
0 0579
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 0001
0 000]
0 0001
0 0001
10.6528
9.5575
8.46]4
7.3524
6.2302
5.0946
2.7018
1.1256
0.6919
0.3992
0.2362
0.1784
0.1635
0.1486
0.1337
0.1089
0.0890
0.0723
0.0698
0.0644
0.0634
0.0632
0.0632
TABLEB-12
ECLIPSECOMPONENTDATACHANGERESULTSMTTRCHANGEFROM] ,080 TO 6 HOURSWITHOUTCHARGEFFECTS
Component Slnqle Component Multiple Component
A EA FOR EFOR A EA FOR EFOR
% % % % % % % %
I
_n
Baseline
i Battery
2 AIpha-PDT
3 DCSU
4 Fault Isolator
5 CDU
6 TCPs
7 Radpn]
8PVSC
9 PMC
10 PDCU
ii OMBSU
12 Inverter
13 Accum
14 DC RBI l&2
15 Pipeset
16 TCPump i&2
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
.9218 89.575] 0.0782 10.4249 99.92]8 89.5751 0.0782 i0
.9218 90.9478 0.0782 9.0522 99.92]8 90.9478 0.0782 9
.9416 90.6733 0.0584 9.3267 99.9416 92.0627 0.0584 7
.9219 90.6732 0.0781 9.3268 99.9416 93.1914 0.0584 6
.9219 90.6732 0.078] 9.3268 99.9416 94.3338 0.0584 5
.9219 90.6732 0.0781 9.3268 99.9417 95.4903 0.0583 4
.9233 93.4101 0.0767 6.5899 99.9418 99.5786 0.0582 0
.9248 89.7218 0.0752 10.2782 99.9421 99.74]6 0.0579 0
.9219 89.6604 0.0781 10.3396 99.9421 99.7991 0.0579 0
.9797 89.6270 0.0203 10.3730 99.9999 99.8570 0.0001 0
.9228 89.6058 0.0772 10.3942 99.9999 99.8719 0.0001 0
.9228 89.6058 0.0772 10.3942 99.9999 99.8868 0.0001 0
.9218 89.6058 0.0782 10.3942 99.9999 99.9017 0.0001 0
.9222 89.5929 0.0778 10.4071 99.9999 99.92]5 0.0001 0
.9219 89.5884 0.078] 10.4116 99.9999 99.9364 0.0001 0
.9221 89.5862 0.0779 10.4138 99.9999 99.9390 0.0001 0
.9219 89.5752 0.0781 10.4248 99.9999 99.9390 0.0001 0
A :
EA :
FOR :
EFOR :
Availability
Equivalent Availability
Forced Outage Rate
Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
.4249
.0522
.9373
.8086
.6662
5097
4214
2584
2009
1430
1281
1132
.0983
.0785
.0636
.0610
.0610
TABLEB- 13
ECLIPSECOMPONENTDATACHANGERESULTSMTTRCHANGEFROM1080 TO6 HRSWITHCHARGEFFECTS
Component
A
%
Single Component Multiple Component
EA FOR EFOR A EA FOR EFOR
% % % % % % %
I
O_
Baseline 99.9210
1 Battery 99.9211
2 Alpha-PDT 99.9415
3 Beta-PDT* 99.9213
4 SSU* 99.9213
5 DCSU 99.9214
6 SAEIec* 99.9213
7 Fault Isolator 99.9211
8 CDU 99.9211
9 RPVB & LPVB* 99.9213
i0 TCPs 99.9230
ii Radpnl 99.9242
12 _ 99.9212
13 PMC 99.9789
14 OMBSU 99.9220
15 PDCU 99.9220
16 Inverter 99.9211
17 Accum 99.9214
18 DC-RBI l&2 99.9210
19 Pipeset 99.9213
20 TCPump l&2 99.9211
75.9550 0.0790 24.0450 99.9210 75.9550 0.0790 24.0450
78.3040 0.0789 21.6960 99.9211 78.3040 0.0789 21.6960
76.8862 0.0585 23.1138 99.9415 79.2639 0.0585 20.7361
76.8848 0.0787 23.1152 99.9416 80.2343 0.0584 19.7657
76.8848 0.0787 23.1152 99.9416 81.2222 0.0584 18.7778
77.8273 0.0786 22.1727 99.9416 83.2232 0.0584 16.7768
76.8848 0.0787 23.1152 99.9416 84.2465 0.0584 15.7535
77.8285 0.0789 22.1715 99.9416 86.3239 0.0584 13.6761
77.8285 0.0789 22.1715 99.9416 88.4543 0.0584 ]1.5457
77.2018 0.0787 22.7982 99.9416 89.9066 0.0584 10.0934
83.8871 0.0770 16.1129 99.9418 99.2927 0.0582 0.7073
76.1625 0.0758 23.8375 99.9421 99.5638 0.0579 0.4362
76.1001 0.0788 23.8999 99.9421 99.6792 0.0579 0.3208
75.9990 0.0211 24.0010 99.9999 99.7370 0.0001 0.2630
75.9809 0.0780 24.0191 99.9999 99.7519 0.000] 0.2481
75.9809 0.0780 24.0191 99.9999 99.7668 0.0001 0.2332
75.9809 0.0789 24.0191 99.9999 99.7817 0.0001 0.2183
75.9802 0.0786 24.0198 99.9999 99.8145 0.0001 0.1855
75.9779 0.0790 24.0221 99.9999 99.8430 0.0001 0.1570
75.9706 0.0787 24.0294 99.9999 99.8474 0.0001 0.1526
75.9550 0.0789 24.0450 99.9999 99.8474 0.0001 0.1526
A : Availability*
EA : Equivalent Availability
FOR : Forced Outage Rate
EFOR : Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
Note : Charge Effect component that is only in
Insl[ System and not in Eclipse System.
TABLEB-14
PMADPDCA-L3COMPONENTDATACHANGERESULTS(MTTRCHANGEFROM1,080 TO6 HOURS)
Component Sinqle Component Multiple Component
A EA FOR EFOR A EA FOR
% % % % % % %
EFOR
%
I
Base]_ne 99.9813 33.3271 0.0187 66.6729 99.9813 33.3271 0.0187 66.6729
] PDCUs 99.9994 33.333] 0.0006 66.6669 99.9994 33.333] 0.0006 66.6669
2 NSUs 99.9833 33.3278 0.0167 66.6722 99.9997 33.3332 0.0003 66.6668
3 MBSUs 99.9830 33.3277 0.0170 66.6723 99.9997 33.3332 0.0003 66.6668
4 XFMRs 99.9825 33.3275 0.0175 66.6725 99.9997 33.3332 0.0003 66.6668
A :
EA :
FOR :
EFOR :
Availability
Equivalent Avai]abi]ity
Forced Outage Rate
EquJva]ent Forced Outage Rate
T/%BLEB-15
V/%RI/%TIONF INSOL/%RRELr/%BILITYWITHMTBFSC/%LEF/%CTOR
Scaling
/%ll Components
Scaling Spared
Scenario Components
MTBF
Scale EA /% EA
Factor (%) (%) (%)
/%
(%)
0.7 85.1047 99
0.8 86.8454 99
0.9 88.2222 99
1.0 89.3472 99
I.i 90.2616 99
1.2 91.0376 99
1.3 9].6993 99
1.4 92.2700 99
1.5 92.7672 99
1.6 93.2044 99
1.7 93.59]8 99
1.8 93.9374 99
1.9 94.2746 99
2.0 94.5276 99
3.0 96.3195 99
4.0 97.2274 99
5.0 97.776] 99
.840] 86.4993 99
.8"l'16 87.6737 99
.9033 88.5956 99
.92]7 89.3472 99
.9353 89.9498 99
.9456 90.46]6 99
.9536 90.8964 99
.9600 91.2704 99
.9652 91.5953 99
.9694 9].8804 99
.9728 92.]325 99
9';58 92.3570 99
9782 92.5582 99
9804 92.7396 99
99]3 93.8943 99
995] 94.4756 99
9969 94.8256 99
.8440
.8795
.9040
.9217
.9348
.9449
.9527
.9590
.9640
.9682
.9717
.9745
.9";70
.9792
.9902
.9942
.996]
A : /%vallabillty
EA: Equivalent Availability
B-]8
TABI.EB-16
INSOLARCOMPONENT MTBF SENSITfVITY ANAI,YSIS (MTTR = 1,080)
Scale Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%) Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
0.70
0.80
0.90
] .00
1.10
1.20
1 30
I 40
1 50
1 60
i 70
1 80
1 90
2 00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Alpha PDT Beta PDT
61320 88.8833 0.70 61320 88.8885
70080 89.0760 0.80 70080 89.0790
78840 89.2264 0.90 78840 89.2278
87600 89.3472 ].00 87600 89.34/2
96360 89.4462 1.10 96360 89.445]
105120 89.5289 ].20 105120 89.5268
113880 89.5990 1.30 113880 89.596]
122640 89.6592 1.40 ]22640 89.6556
131400 89.7114 ].50 131400 89.70"12
140160 89.'157] ].60 140160 89.1524
]48920 89.7975 1.70 148920 89.'1924
]57680 89.8334 1,80 157680 89.8279
166440 89.8656 ].90 166440 89.8597
]75200 89.8946 2.00 1"15200 89.8883
262800 90.0785 3.00 262800 90.0702
350400 90.]708 4.00 350400 90.]6]4
438000 90.2262 5.00 438000 90.2162
0.70
O .80
0.90
1.00
1 .I0
1.20
1.30
1.40
] .50
1.60
1.70
1.80
I .90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
DSCU SAE]ect
6]320
70080
78840
87600
96360
105120
113880
122640
131400
]40160
148920
157680
166440
175200
262800
350400
438000
88.8885
89.0790
89.2278
89.3472
89.445]
89.5268
89.596]
89.6556
89.7072
89.7524
89 "7924
89 8279
89 8597
89 8883
90 0702
90,1614
90,2]62
O. 70
0.80
0.90
1.00
] .10
1.20
] 3O
1 4O
1 50
] 6O
] 7O
1 80
1 9O
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61320 88.8885
70080 89.0"790
78840 89.22"78
87600 89.34'72
96360 89.4451
105120 89.5268
]13880 89.596]
122640 89.6556
131400 89.'70"72
140160 89.7524
148920 89.7924
]57680 89.8229
166440 89.8597
1'75200 89.8883
262800 90.0702
350400 90.1614
438000 90.2162
(Cont I nued)
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TABLE B-J6 (Continued)
INSOLAR COMPONENT MTBF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (MTTR = ],080)
Scale Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%) Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
PMC Inverter
0.70 30660 89.
0.80 35040 89.
0.90 39420 89,
1.00 43800 89.
i.i0 48]80 89,
1.20 52560 89,
1.30 56940 89.
1.40 61320 89,
1.50 65700 89
1.60 70080 89
1.70 74460 89
1.80 78840 89
1.90 83220 89
2.00 87600 89
3.00 131400 89
4.00 175200 89.
5.00 219000 89.
2955
3191
3354
3472
3560
3627
3680
3722
3756
3784
3807
3826
3843
3857
3930
3956
3968
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1 10
] 2O
1 30
] 4O
] 50
1 60
1 "lO
] 8O
] 9O
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
30660 89.3265
35040 89.3357
39420 89.3423
43800 89.3472
48180 89.3510
52560 89.3540
56940 89.3565
61320 89.3585
65700 89.3602
70080 89.3616
74460 89.3629
78840 89.3639
83220 89.3648
87600 89.3657
131400 89.3704
175200 89.3726
219000 89.3737
OMBSU PDCU
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
I.i0
1.20
].30
I.40
I.50
1.60
1.70
i .80
i .90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61320
70080
78840
87600
96360
105120
113880
122640
132400
140160
]48920
157680
166440
175200
262800
350400
438000
89.3265
89.3357
89.3423
89.3472
89.35]0
89.3540
89.3565
89.3585
89.3602
89.36]6
89.3629
89.3639
89.3648
89.3657
89.3704
89.3726
89.3]37
.
0.
0.
1.
I.
I.
I.
i.
I.
1.
i.
1.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
70
80
90
00
10
2O
30
4O
50
60
70
80
90
00
00
00
00
91980
105120
118260
]32400
144540
157680
170820
183960
197100
210240
223380
236520
249660
262800
394200
525600
657000
89.3265
89.3357
89.3423
89.3472
89.3510
89.3540
89.3565
89.3585
89.3602
89.3616
89.3629
89.3639
89.3648
89.3657
89.3704
89.3726
89.3737
(Continued)
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INSOLAR COMPONENT
TAB[,E B-16 (Continued)
MTBF SENSITIVITY ANAI,YS/S (MTTR = 1,080)
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
SSU
0.70 61320 88.8885
0.80 70080 89.0190
0.90 78840 89.2278
1.00 87600 89.3d72
I.i0 96360 89.445]
]..20 ]05]20 89.5268
1.30 113880 89.596l
1.40 122640 89.6556
1.50 131400 89.7072
1.60 ]40160 89.7524
].70 ]48920 89.']924
1.80 157680 89.8279
1.90 166440 89.8597
2.00 175200 89.8883
3.00 262800 90.0702
4.00 350400 90.]6]4
5.00 438000 90.2162
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hou[s) System EA (%)
TCPs
0.70 91980 88.3876
0.80 105120 88.7865
0.90 118260 89.0977
].00 131400 89.34'12
].]0 144540 89.5517
].20 15"/680 89.7223
].30 170820 89.8669
1.40 183960 89.99]0
].50 197100 90.0986
].60 210240 90.]928
].'I0 223380 90.2"16]
1.80 236520 90.3500
1.90 249660 90.4]63
2.00 262800 90.4760
3.00 394200 90.8544
4.00 525600 9].0441
5.00 65"1000 9].1580
A-GimCntr]r
0.70
o .80
0 9O
I O0
1 I0
l 2O
I 30
1 4O
1 50
i 60
1 7O
] 80
1 90
2 O0
3 O0
4 O0
5 O0
61320 89.2057
70080 89.2645
78840 89.3]04
87600 89.3472
96360 89.3774
105120 89.4027
113880 89.4240
122640 89.4424
131400 89.4583
140160 89.4722
148920 89.4846
157680 89.4955
166440 89.5054
175200 89.5142
262800 89.5703
350400 89.5984
438000 89.6153
A -Gi mB_ ng
0.70 91980 89.2523
0.80 105120 89.29]8
0.90 118260 89.3225
1.00 131400 89.3472
1.10 144540 89.3674
].20 157680 89.3843
1.30 170820 89.3986
1.40 ]83960 89.4108
1.50 ]97100 89.4214
1.60 210240 89.4308
].70 223380 89.4390
].80 236520 89.4463
1.90 249660 89.4529
2.00 262800 89.4588
3.00 394200 89.4962
4.00 525600 89.5149
5.00 657000 89.5262
B-21
VARIATION OF
TABLF. B-17
ECI.IPSE RF:[,TABIt,fTY WITH MTBF SCAI.F,
WITHOUT CHARGE KFFECTS
FACTOR
MTBF
Scale
Factor
Scaling
All Components
Scaling Spared
Scenario Components
0.7 85
0.8 87
0.9 88
1.0 89
I .I 90
i .2 91
I .3 91
1.4 92
1.5 92
1.6 93
1.7 93
] .8 94
1.9 94
2.0 94
3.0 96
4.0 97
5.0 97
EA A EA A
(%) (%) (%) (%)
.3182 99.8410
.0755 99.8781
.4584 99.9036
5"151 99.9218
4943 99.9354
2652 99.9457
9207 99.9537
4847 99.9600
9752 99.9652
4057 99.9694
7866 99.9729
]258 99.9758
4299 99.9783
7041 99.9804
4515 99.9913
3319 99.9951
8624 99.9969
86.5302 99.8447
87.'/886 99.8799
88.7773 99.9043
89.5751 99,9218
90.2310 99,9350
90.7809 99.9449
91.2483 99.9528
91.6504 99.9590
91.9999 99.9641
92.3066 99.9682
92.5779 99.9717
92.8195 99.9746
93.0361 99.9"171
93.2314 99.9792
94.4753 99.9902
95.1020 99.9942
95.4795 99.9960
A : Availabi]_ty
EA: Equivalent Ava_lal)Jlity
B-22
ECLIPSE
TABI.E B-18
COMPONENT MTBF SENS/TfVJ'I'Y ANAI,YSIS
WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS
(MTTR =- 1,080)
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
Alpha PDT
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.I0
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
l.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61 320
70 080
78 840
87 600
96360
105,120
113,880
122,640
131,400
140,160
]48,920
157,680
]66,440
175,200
262,800
350,400
438,000
89.1100
89.3032
89.4541
89.5"/5l
89.6744
89.7573
89.8276
89.8879
89.9402
9.9861
90.0266
90.0626
90.0949
90.1239
90.3083
90.4008
90.4564
DCSU
0.70
0.80
0.90
1 00
1 10
1 20
1 30
1 40
1 50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61
70
78
87
96
105
113
]22
131
140
148
157
166
175
262
350
438
320
080
840
600
360
120
88O
64O
4OO
160
92O
68O
44O
2OO
8OO
4O0
000
89.1100
89.3032
89 4541
89 575]
89 6744
89 7573
89 8276
89 8879
89 9402
89 9861
90 0266
90 0626
90 0949
90.1239
90.3083
90.4008
90.4564
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
CDU Fault Isolator
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.I0
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
I.80
1.90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61 320
70080
78,840
87,600
96,360
105 120
113880
122,640
131,400
140 160
148,920
157,680
]66,440
]75,200
262,800
350,400
438000
88.6473
89.0321
89.3332
89.5"151
89.T138
89.9399
90.0808
90.2018
90.3068
90.3989
90.4803
90.5527
90.6176
90.6"160
91.04"/6
91.2342
91.3464
pvsc
o
0
0
1
I
I
i
] 40
1 50
1 60
1 70
1 80
1 90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
7o
80
90
O0
10
20
30
30,660
35,040
39,420
43,800
48 180
52,560
56,940
61,320
65,700
70,080
74,460
78,840
83220
87,600
131400
175 200
219 000
89.510]
89.5391
89.5598
89.5"151
89.5868
89.5960
89.6033
89.6093
89.6143
89.6185
89.6220
89.625]
89.6217
89.6300
89.6429
89.6484
89.6541
B-23
(Cont inued)
ECLIPSE
TABLEB-J8 (Continued)
COMPONENT MTBF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS
(MTTR = 1,080)
Scale
Factor
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
i.i0
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
i.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
Inverter
61
70
78
87
96
I05
]13
122
131
140
148
157
166
175
262
35O
438
Scale
Factor
320 89.5544 0.70
080 89.5635 0.80
840 89.5"I02 0.90
600 89.5"151 l.O0
360 89.5'190 1.iO
120 89.5820 1.20
880 89.5845 1.30
640 89.5865 1.40
400 89.5882 ].50
]60 89.5896 1.60
920 89.5909 1.70
680 89.5919 1.80
440 89.5928 ].90
,200 89.5937 2.00
,800 89.5985 3.00
,400 89.6006 4.00
,000 89.60]7 5.00
MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
TCPs
9]
]05
118
]3]
144
157
]70
183
197
210
223
236
249
262
394
525
657
980 87.96"1]
120 88.6339
260 89.1556
400 89.5'15]
540 89.9197
680 90.20'17
820 90.4520
960 90.6620
I00 90.8443
240 91.004]
380 91.1453
520 91.2710
660 9].3836
800 9].4851
200 92.1299
600 92.4539
000 92.6487
OMBSU
O. 70
0.80
0.90
1.00
] .10
1.20
1.30
] .40
1.50
1.60
I.70
] .80
] .90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61
70
78
87
96
105
113
122
131
140
148
157
]66
]75
262
350
438
320 89
080 89
840 89
600 89
360 89
120 89
880 89
640 89
400 89
160 89
920 89
680 89
440 89
200 89
800 89
400 89
000 89
.5544
.5635
.5"102
• 5'151
.5"190
.5820
.5845
.5865
.5882
.5896
.5909
5919
5928
593"1
5985
6006
60]7
0.70
0.80
0.90
i.00
I.]0
].20
I.30
].40
1.50
] 60
] 70
1 80
] 90
2 00
3 00
4.00
5.00
B-24
PDCU
6]
70
78
87
96
105
113
]22
]31
140
148
157
166
175
262
35O
438
320
080
840
600
360
120
880
640
400
160
920
,680
440
200
800
,400
,000
89.5544
89.5635
89.5"102
89.5'15]
89.5'190
89.5820
89.5845
89.5865
89.5882
89.5896
89.5909
89.5919
89.5928
89.5937
89.5985
89.6006
89.601"I
(Continued)
ECLIPSE COMPONENT
TABLE B-18 (Continued)
MTBF SENS]TIVITY ANAI.YSIS
WITHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS
(MTTR = 1,080)
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
PMC
0.70
0.80
0.90
l 00
I 10
] 20
1 30
1 40
1 50
I.60
i."I0
].80
1.90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
30
35
39
43
48
52
56
61
65
70
74
78
83
87
131
175
219
660
040
420
800
180
560
94O
320
700
080
460
840
220
600
40O
200
000
89.5233
89.5469
89.5633
89.5751
89.5839
89.5907
89 5960
89 6002
89 6036
89 6064
89 6087
89 6]07
89 6]23
89 6137
89 6211
89 623'7
89 6249
B-25
TABLE B-]9
VARIATION OF ECLIPSE REI.IABIL[TY WITH MTBF SCA[.E
(With Cha[ge E[[ects)
FACTOR
Scaling Sca]_ng Spa[ed
A]I Components Scena[|o Components
MTBF
Scale
Facto[
EA A £A A
(%) (%) (%) (%)
0.7
0.8
0.9
] 0
] I
] 2
] 3
l 4
1 5
] 6
l 7
] 8
1.9
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
67.3951 99.8363 69.'7498 99.8420
"10.8905 99.8'157 "?2.2"?24 99.8"/82
"13.6448 99.9022 74.2968 99.9032
'15.9550 99.9210 75.9550 99.9210
"77.8984 99.9348 77.3422 99.9343
79.5514 99.9453 78.5159 99.9445
80.9"156 99.9535 79.5228 99.9524
82.2150 99.9599 80.3961 99.9587
83.3033 99.9651 81.1605 99.9638
84.266] 99.9693 81.8353 99.9680
85.1246 99.9728 82.4354 99.9'115
85.8947 99.9'158 82.9724 99.9744
86.5888 99.9782 83.4558 99.9769
87.2181 99.9803 83.8933 99.9790
91.3017 99.9912 86.7171 99.9901
93.4086 99.995] 88.]641 99.9942
94.6943 99.9968 89.0435 99.9960
A : Availability
EA: Equivalent Ava]labllity
I_ -26
ECLIPSECOMPONENT
TABLE B-20
MTBF SENS]TfVI'I'Y ANAI.YSIS
WITH CHARGE EFFECTS
(MTTR = 1,080)
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
Alpha PDCU
0.70 61320 "15.5606
0.80 70080 75.7244
0.90 78840 75.8523
1.00 87600 "15.9550
].]0 96360 "16.0392
1.20 ]05]20 16.1095
1.30 113880 76.169]
1.40 122640 "16.2202
].50 131400 76.2646
1.60 140160 76.3034
1.70 148920 76.3378
1.80 157680 76.3683
1.90 166440 76.3957
2.00 1"15200 16.4203
3.00 262800 76.5767
4.00 350400 76.655]
5.00 438000 76.7023
DCSU
0.70 6]320
0.80 70080
0.90 78840
].00 87600
I.i0 96360
1.20 105120
1.30 113880
].40 122640
1.50 131400
1.60 ]40]60
].70 148920
1.80 ]57680
1.90 166440
2.00 1"15200
3.00 262800
4.00 350400
5.00 438000
75. ]'107
15.4974
"15. '7537
15.9550
76.]262
"76.2644
76.3872
76.48"18
"16.5"154
76.65"1 ]
76. '1249
16 '185]
76 8389
76 8819
77 20"13
77 3622
77 4609
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
P[_U/Fault Isolator
0.70 61320 74.3885
0.80 70080 75.0362
0.90 78840 75.5466
].00 87600 '15.9550
1.10 96360 16.2916
].20 ]05]20 16.5745
].30 113880 /6.8156
1.40 ]22640 7'1.0233
].50 131400 77.2002
1.60 ]40]60 77.3595
].70 148920 77.4969
1.80 151680 77.6232
].90 166440 T/.7327
2.00 175200 77.8357
3.00 262800 18.4730
4.00 350400 78.1938
5.00 438000 78.9887
PVSC
0.70
0.80
0.90
] .00
] .10
] 20
] 30
l 40
1 50
1 60
1 70
] 80
] 90
2 O0
3 O0
4.00
5.00
30660
35040
39420
43800
48]80
52560
56940
61320
65100
"10080
74460
78840
53220
8"1600
131400
1.75200
219000
75.8442
75.8939
"15.9290
"15.9550
75.9'148
"15.9904
"/6.0032
76.0133
76.02]8
76.0288
76.0349
76.0400
76.0445
76.0484
'16.0704
76.0'197
76.0849
(Continued)
B-2"l
TABI,E B-20 (Continued)
ECLIPSE COMPONENT MTBF SENSFrIV]TY ANAI.VSIS (MTTR = 1,080)
WITH CHARGE EFFECTS
Scale
Factor MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
Sca]e
Facto[ MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
PMC Beta PDT INSI,R Component _n CEs
15 9110
15 93]0
15 9449
15 9550
75 9625
75 9682
"15 9727
15 9'762
15 9"79]
15 98] 5
"]5 9835
15 985]
15 9865
"/5 98'17
75 9939
75 996]
75 9972
0.70 30660
0.80 35040
0.90 39420
1.00 43800
].10 48180
1.20 52560
1.30 56940
1.40 6]320
1.50 65700
1.60 ';0080
].70 74460
1.80 78840
1.90 83220
2.00 87600
3.00 131400
4.00 1"75200
5.00 2]9000
O. 70
0.80
0.90
I O0
] 10
] 20
l 30
] 40
1 50
] .60
]. 70
] .80
] .90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61320 75.5630
70080 75.72"13
78840 75.8562
8'1600 75.9550
96360 76.0419
105120 76.]096
]13880 16.]'125
122640 76.22]6
131400 76.2625
140]60 76.30"10
148920 "76.3401
15"1680 76.3695
]66440 16.3956
115200 76.4197
262800 76.5805
350400 76.6556
438000 "76.7062
SAE]ect - INS[.R Component Jn CEs SSU - JNSI.R Component in CEs
0.70 61320
0.80 70080
0.90 78840
1.00 87600
1.10 96360
1.20 105120
1.30 113880
1.40 122640
1.50 131400
1.60 140160
J.70 ]48920
1.80 157680
1.90 166440
2.00 175200
3.00 262800
4.00 350400
5.00 438000
75
"15
15
"15
76
76
76
76
"16
76
'16
5630
"1273
8562
9550
0419
1096
1725
2216
2625
3070
340]
76 3695
76 3965
16 419"1
76 5805
"/6 6556
16.1062
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
J .]0
] .20
] .30
1.40
] 50
] 6O
] 'I0
] 8O
] 90
2 O0
3 O0
4.00
5.00
61320 75.5630
70080 75.'12"13
78840 75.8562
8"1600 75.9550
96360 76.04]9
105120 "16.]096
113880 76.1725
122640 '16.2216
]31400 "16.2625
140160 76.3070
]48920 76.340]
]57680 76.3695
166440 76.3956
175200 76.4197
262800 76.5805
350400 76.6556
438000 76.7062
(Continued)
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TABI,E B-20 (Continued)
ECL,fPSE COMPONENT MTBF SENSJTIVJTY ANALYSIS (MTTR = ] ,080)
...........................................................................
Scale Scale
Facto[ MTBF (Hours) System EA (%) Facto[ MTBF (Hours) System EA (%)
Inverter TCPs
0.70
0 80
0 90
1 O0
i ]0
i 20
] 30
1 4O
I 50
1 60
] 70
I 8O
] 9O
2 O0
3 O0
4.00
5.OO
0.70
0.80
0.90
I O0
I ]0
1 20
I 3O
1 4O
1 50
1 60
] "10
1 8O
i .90
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
61320 "75.93"74
"10080 '15.9452 0
"78840 15.9508 0
87600 15.9550 ]
96360 75.9582 ]
]05]20 15.9608 ]
]]3880 15. 9629 ]
]22640 '15.9646 ]
131400 "75.966] ]
] 40] 60 "15.9673 ]
148920 75.9683 ]
157680 "/5.9692 ]
166440 '75.9"700 ]
175200 /5.9'107 2
262800 'I 5.9"747 3
350400 75.9'765 4
438000 15.9T15 5
OMBSU
61320
70080
78840
8"7600
96360
105]20
113880
122640
131400
140160
148920
157680
166440
]75200
262800
350400
438000
'75.9374
75.9452
'15.9508
15 9550
"75 9582
'15 9608
15 9629
'15 9646
'15 966]
15 96"13
15 9683
'15. 9692
'75.9"700
"15.9'107
'15.9'147
"15.9'165
"15. 9775
0 70 91980 "12. "181]
80 105]20 74.08"10
90 ]18260 '15.]198
00 131400 '15.9550
]0 144540 "76.6480
20 15'1680 "1"7.22"19
30 ]'10820 "1"7.'1236
40 ]83960 '18.]569
50 19'I]00 "18.52'13
60 210240 78.8523
70 223380 79.]461
80 236520 79.404]
90 249660 '19.6369
O0 262800 79.8464
00 394200 81.]916
O0 525600 81.8656
00 65'1000 82.2"765
PDCU
.
0.
0.
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
1
]
I
2.
3.
4.
5.
"10 61320 '15.9374
80 70080 '15.9452
90 "18840 "15.9508
O0 81600 15.9550
lO 96360 '15. 9582
20 ]05]20 '15.9608
30 ] 13880 "75.9629
40 ]22640 "75.9646
50 131400 "15.966]
60 140160 '75.96"73
"lO ]48920 '15. 9683
80 15'1680 "75. 9692
90 166440 '15.9700
00 ]'75200 "15.9"707
O0 262800 '15. 9747
O0 350400 "75.9"]65
00 438000 "75.9"775
B-29
'I'ABI,_ B-2I
VARIATION OF PMAD PDCA-[,3 REI,IAI_II,I'I'Y WITH MTBF SCALE FACTOR
Sca Iing
A11 Components
Sca l _ng Spa red
Scena r i o Component s
MTBF
Scale gA A _:A A
Factor (%) (%) (%) (%)
0.'7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1 1
] 2
1 3
1 4
l 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
l 9
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
33.3186 99.9558
33.3228 99.9683
33.3254 99.9/61
33.3271 99.9813
33.3283 99.9850 33
33.3292 99.9877 33
33.3299 99.9897 33
33.3304 99.9912 33
33.3308 99.9924 33
33.331] 99.9934 33
33.3314 99.9942 33
33.33J6 99.9949 33
33.3318 99.9954 33
33.3320 99.9959 33
33.3327 99.9982 33
33.3330 99.9989 33
33.333] 99.9993 33
33.3209
33 3238
33 325'I
33 3231
3281
3289
3295
3300
3304
3303
3310
33]2
3314
33]6
3324
3323
3328
99.9627
99.9'713
99.9771
99.9813
99.9844
99.9867
99.9886
99.9900
99.9912
99.9921
99.9930
99.9936
99.9942
99.9947
99.99"72
99.998]
99.9985
A : Availability
_A" Equivalent Availabil-ity
I_-30
TABI.KP,-22
PMAD PDCU MTBF SENSJT[VI'I'Y ANAI,YSIS (MT'I'R: 1,080)
..........................................
Scale
Factor MTHF (Hours) System EA (%) Power
PMC
0.70 6]320
0.80 70080
0.90 78840
l.O0 8"1600
1.10 96360
1.20 105120
1.30 113880
1.40 122640
1.50 ]3]400
1.60 140160
1.70 148920
1.80 151680
].90 166440
2.00 1"15200
3.00 262800
4.00 350400
5.00 438000
33 3209
33 3238
33 3257
33 32"1]
33 328]
33 3289
33 3295
33 33OO
33 3304
33 3307
33 3310
33 3312
33 3314
33 33]6
33 3324
33 3327
33 3328
24.9906"15
24.99285
24.9942'/5
24.995325
24.9960"/5
24.9966"15
24.997125
24.99/5
24.99"18
24.998025
24.99825
24.9984
24.99855
24.9987
24.9993
24.999525
24.9996
B--31
TABLE B-23
INSO[,AR SYSTEM Dr,SIGN AND OPERATIONAl, COMPAR]SON
System Variation A EA FOR EFOR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Baseline: MTTR:] 080 99.92]7 89.3472 0.0783 ]0.6528
Baseline: MTTR: 6 99.9998 99. 7735 0.0002 0.2265
I
bo
_o
Sparing Scenario
Baseline with
A]] Component MTBFs Doubled
Sparing Scenario with
All Component MTBFs Doub]ed
Baseline with
Sparing Scenario Component MTBFs Doubled
99.9998 96.2047 0.0002 3.'1953
99.9804 94.52"16 0.0196 5.4724
99.9999 98.0785 0.000] ].9215
99.9792 92.7396 0.0208 7.2604
: Availability
EA : Equivalent Availability
FOR : Forced Outage Rate
EFOR : Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
ECLIPSE
TABLEB-24
SYSTEMDESIGNANDOPERATIONALCOMPARISON
WITHOUTCHARGEFFECTS
System Variation
Baseline: MTTR:1080
A EA FOR EFOR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
99.92]8 89.575] 0 0782 10.4249
Baseline: MTTR:6 99.9999 99.9390 0 000] 0.0610
I
Sparing Scenario
Baseline with
All Component MTBFs Doubled
Sparing Scenario with
All Component MTBFs Doubled
Baseline with
Sparing Scenario Component MTBF_ Doubled
99.9998 96.9585
99.9804 94.7041
99.9999 98.4926
99.9792 93.2314
00O2
0196
000]
O2O8
3.0415
5.2959
]. 5074
6. "/686
A : Availability
EA : Equivalent Availability
FOR : Forced Outage Rate
EFOR : Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
TABLEB-25
ECI,TPSE SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATTONAI. COMPARISON
WITH CHARGE EFFECTS
System Variation A EA FOR EFOR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Baseline: MTTR:]080 99.9210 75.9550 0.0790 24.0450
I
Baseline: MTTR-6
Sparing Scenario
Baseline w]th
All Component MTBFs Doubled
Sparing Scenario with
All Component M'I'Y_FsDoubled
Basel ine with
Spar]ng Scenario Component MTBFs Doubled
99.9999 99.8474 0.0001 0.1526
99.9998 92.5490 0.0002 7.45]0
99.9803 87.218] 0.019'7 12.7819
99.9999 96.2409 0.000] 3. 7591
99.9790 83.8933 0.0210 16.1067
O0
,._ ::_
r',l_
A :
EA :
FOR :
EFOR :
AvaJlabilJty
Equivalent Availability
Forced Outage Rate
Equ]va]ent Forced Outage Rate
TABLEB-26
PMADPDCA-L3 SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL COMPARISON
System Variation A EA FOR EFOR
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Baseline: MTTR:I080 99.9813 33.32"l] 0.0187 66.6"129
Baseline: MTTR:6 99.9999 33.3333 0.000] 66.6667
tn
Sparing Scenario
Baseline with
All Component MTBFs Doubled
Sparing Scenario with
All Component MTBFs Doub]ed
Baseline with
Sparing Scenario Component MTRFs Doubled
99.9994 33.3331 0.0006 66.6669
99.9959 33.3320 0.004] 66.6680
99.9998 33.3333 0.000P 66.6667
99.9947 33.3316 0.0053 66.6684
A : Availability
EA : Equivalent AvailabJlity
FOR : Forced Outage Rate
EFOR : Equivalent Forced Outage Rate
'rAMI.EB-27
PMADMODEl.CONFIGURATIONCOMPARISON
M'I"I'R_]080 M'I'TR_6
Model
Configuration EA (%) A (%) EA (%) A (%)
...................................
Ring (PDCA--I,3) 33.327] 99.98]3 33.3333 99.9999
Radial 33.328] 99.9842 33.3333 99.9999
Outside PDCU 32.6324 97.8973 33.3295 99.9886
EA :
A :
B--36
'rABI,F. B-28
EPS J-NBOI,AR I"t':1:_I OD STATE PROBAB I I, I T I ES OF
POWER OUTPUT FROM PDCA-I,3
Output
State
Output State State
Casaba1 _t __ (__%)............... P[ o_babjj i ty ........
Output Power
Leve] (kw)
MTTR = 1080
33.33 0.99"1308 24.99'15
31.83 0.000550 23.8'125
25.00 0.00]06] 18.'1500
24.69 0.000036 18.51"15
24.38 0.000001 ]8.2850
12.50 0.0000'13 9.3750
]2.19 0.000001 9.]425
0.00 0.0009'70 0.0000
Equivalent Ava_ ]abi 1I ty 33.29%
Averaqe Power Ou_t_p_utCapa_b:i ] i_ty___L_2--4.96_46__kw .......
MTTR: 6
I 33.33 0.999995 24.9975
2 31.83 0.000000 23.8725
3 25.00 0.000003 ]8.7500
4 24.69 0.000000 18.51"15
5 24.38 0.000000 18.2850
6 12.50 0.000000 9.3"150
7 12.19 0.000000 9.]425
8 0.00 0.000003 0.0000
Equivalent Availability - 33.33%
Averaqe Power Outp_utC__gRgb__!Jlity____24:99"14kw .......................
Sparing Eight Critlca] ORUs
33 33 0.999911 24.99"15
31 83
25 O0
24 69
24 38
12 50
12.19
0.00
0.000060 23.8725
0.00001"1 ]8.7500
0.000001 18.51"75
0.000000 18.2850
O.O0000l 9.3"/50
0.000000 9.1425
0.000008 0.0000
Equivalent AvallalMlJty = 33.33%
Averaqe Power Output. CaRah_!ity = _24.99'1] _kw ...........................................
B 3 1
TABI.E B-29
EPS ECI.IPSE PERIOD STATE PROBABII.I-TIES OF POWER OUTPUT
FROM PDCA-I,3 WETHOUT CHARGE EFFECTS
MT'rR- ] 080
Output
State
Output State State
Capabi 1_ t y_ (%%) ................. P [_obabil_t_y "
Output Power
Level (kw)
1 33.33 0.998222 24
2 30.00 0.000524 22
3 25.00 0.000209 18
4 20.00 0.00006] 15
5 ]5.00 0.000012 ii
6 10.00 0.000004 7
'1 5.00 0.000000 3
8 0.00 0.000969 0
Equivalent Availability = 33.29%
Averaqe Power Output Cgpgbi]![y_/:/ 24__9698_ k_w ......................
99'15
5000
7500
0000
2500
5000
75O0
0000
MT'rR- 6
1 33.33 0.999998 24.99'15
2 30.00 0.000000 22.5000
3 25.00 0.000000 18.'1500
4 20.00 0.000000 15.0000
5 15.00 0.000000 11.2500
6 10.00 0.000000 7.5000
I 5.00 0.000000 3.7500
8 0.00 O.O00001 0.0000
Equivalent Availability : 33.33%
Aver_a__qe Power Outp_ut Capab__] ___t_y= 2.4_ 99_/5_ k_w .......................................
Spar ]nO E]qht Cri t_ical ORLJ._
33
30
25
20
15 O0
]0 O0
5 O0
0.00
33
O0
O0
O0
0.9999/3 24.9915
0.000008 22.5000
0.000009 18.7500
O.O0000l ]5.0000
0.000000 11.2500
0.000000 7.5000
0.000000 3.7500
0.000008 0.0000
Equiva]ent Availability : 33.33%
kveraqe Power Out l2u!ga_bj]_ty. 24,99"l _ kw.................................
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'I'ABI.I< fl-30
EPS ECI. IPSE PI<RIOD STATF. PROBABII.PPJF.S OF POWER
OUTPUT FROM PDC.A--[,3WITH CHARGR _;FFEC'fS
MTTR=I080
Output
State
Output State Stale Output Power
...... _[_9_bJ__Y .......... Level (kw)
1 33.33
2 30.00
3 25.00
4 20.00
5 15.00
6 10.00
7 5.00
8 0.00
Equivalent Availability = 33.25%
Averaqe Power
0.991804 24.9975
0.003"166 22.5000
0.002011 18.7500
0.000945 15.0000
0.000337 11.2500
0.000133 7.5000
0.000027 3.7500
0.000977 0.0000
Output_. C_apabj__] I t Z - --__'2_4_,93_41_ k_w_...........................................
M'I'TR- 6
] 33.33 0.999996 24.99'15
2 30.00 0.000000 22.5000
3 25.00 0.000003 ]8.'1500
4 20.00 0.000000 15.0000
5 15.00 0.000000 11.2500
6 10.00 0.000000 7.5000
7 5.00 0.000000 3./500
8 0.00 0.000003 0.0000
Equivalent Availability - 33.33 %
Averaqe Power Output Ca_p_9_b_lityj-24_99j5kw_
Sparing Eight Critical ORUs
1 33.33 0.999894 24
2 30.00 0.000050 22
3 25.00 0.000035 18
4 20.00 0.000009 15
5 15.00 0.000002 11
6 10.00 0.000001 7
7 5.00 0.000000 3
8 0.00 0.000008 0
Equivalent Availability - 33.33%
Averaqe PoweqOu_Q_ut_p_p_kCgp.abil__t..24:_9968 - kw_ .........
.99'/5
.5000
.'1500
.0000
.2500
.5000
.7500
.0000
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TABI.E B-3]
BASEI.INE SPACE S'I'ATfON EPS EXPECTED AVERAGE ANNUAl, ORU FAIt.URE RATE
ORU Quant i ty
Average Annual
ORU Failure Rate
*SAEIec 8 0.8000
*SSU 8 0.8000
*Beta PDT 8 0.8000
B-G_mBrng 8 0.5333
G-GJmCntrlr 8 0.8000
B-GimMtr 1&2 ]6 1.6000
*DCSU 8 0.8000
Inverter 8 0.8000
PVSC 8 1.6000
Plpeset 12 0.4000
Accum 12 0.8000
TCPump1&2 24 0.1500
OMBSU 4 0.4000
*Alpha-PDT 2 0.2000
A-GimBrng 2 0.1333
A-GmCntrlr 2 0.2000
A-GimMtr ]&2 4 0.4000
*PDCU-
Outboard A-Jnt 4 0.4000
PMAD Inside 28 2.8000
PMAD Outside 4 0.4000
*PMC 2 0.4000
XFMR 8 0.5333
NSU I0 ].0000
MBBU 4 0.4000
Fault Isolator 20 2.0000
CDU 20 2.0000
DC-RBI 1&2 40 4.0000
Subtotal 282 25.7499
*TCPs 136 9.0667
TOTAL 418 34.8166
Failure Rate When Only Critical ORU M'I'SFs are
Doubled is 16.0833
*Critical ORU
................ 13---40.......................
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APPENDIXD
DEFINITIONSOFTERMSANDCONCEPTSUSEDIN THIS REPORT
Availability (A) - The percentage of time that a system is capable of
producing power (Ref. ]).
Equivalent Availabllity (EA) - The percentage of the gross maximum energy
production of the system is available during a given period (Ref. l).
Figure D-I provides a visual representation of equivalent availability.
Figure D-la is a graph of the power output states listed In Table D-I.
The area under the curve in Figure D-la represents the amount of energy
produced by the system. Figure D-lb is an equlva]ent representation of
the energy in Figure D-la. Both boxes in Figure D-ib represent the
equivalent avallabJ]ity of the system, which is 67.5 percent. Box 1 shows
100-percent power generated for 67.5 percent of the period. Box 2 shows
67.5-percent power generated for 100 percent of the period. The key is
that in either case, 67.5 percent of the gross maximum energy production
is avallable during the period.
Equivalent Forced Outage Rate (EFOR) - the percentage of the gross maximum
energy production of the system that is desired within a certain period
but is unavailable (Ref. i). Since the Space Station EPS is modeled with
zero reserve shutdown hours (Section ].2.9) and zero scheduled outage
hours (Section 1.2.10), EFOR _ I - EA.
Failure Rate (k) - The average number of failures that occur per unit of
time in a specified time interval (Ref. 2).
Forced Outaqe Hours (FOH) - The number of hours for which the system is
unavailable as a result of fuji (]00 percent) forced outages.
Forced Outaqe Rate (FOR) - The percentage of time service in a system is
desired but is unaval]able as a result of full (i00 percent) forced
outages (Ref. I).
Maintainability (M) - The probabl]ity that a failed system is restored to
operable condition in a specified amount of downtime (Ref. 3).
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) - The average time that a component
operates before it falls.
D-]
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FIGURE D-I
ILLUSTRATION OF EQUIVAI,ENT AVAII.ABILITY
TABLE D-]
SAMPLE SYSTEM POWER OUTPUT STATES
Output State Output State State Output
State Capability Probability Power t.evel
% kW
] 100.00 0.3500 75.00
2 75.00 0.2500 56.25
3 50.00 0.2000 37.50
4 25.00 0.1500 18.75
5 0.00 0.0500 0.00
Mean Time To Restore (MTTR) The average amount of time that a component
will be in a system in a failed state.
Reliabillt_ (R) The probability that a system used under stated
conditions will perform satisfactorily for at least a given period
(Ref. 3).
Reserve Shutdown Hours (RSH) - The number of hours that a system is
available but is not generating power because of economic or other
reasons. For example when power is not needed, the system is not operated.
D-2
Scheduled Outaqe Hours (SOH) - The number of hours that a system Js
unavallable as a result of planned outages or scheduled maintenance
outages. Both a scheduled malntenance outage and a planned outage are
periods during which a system is shut down. Maintenance Is performed
during a scheduled maintenance outage but it is not performed during a
planned outage.
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